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I. INTRODUCTION
This symposium addresses one of the most important, complex,
and vexing issues in criminal legal theory and practice: how the crimi-
nal law takes account of the relations of domination in shaping de-
fenses or excuses to explain otherwise criminal conduct. This issue has
been highlighted over the last twenty years by the particular circum-
stances and cases of battered women who kill their assailants, cases
which have captured national and international attention," the interest
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. An earlier version of this article was presented at
the symposium Self-Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral and Legal Perspectives on Bat-
tered Women Who Kill on April 21, 1995, jointly sponsored by the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law and the University of Pittsburgh Department of Philosophy. Thanks to Kristin
Bebelaar for her invaluable conceptual, research, and editorial assistance, to Clare Dalton, Betty
Levinson, Michael Madow, Holly Maguigan, and Sue Osthoff for comments on an earlier draft
and to Jennifer Toritto for research assistance. A Brooklyn Law School Faculty Research grant
generously supported my research and writing.
1. Cases such as those of Francine Hughes, whose 1977 killing of her abusive husband was
made into the television movie, The Burning Bed, see, e.g., Pamela Sommers, "Burning Bed"
Evokes Strong Response, WAs. Post, Oct. 10, 1984, illustrate the broad national interest in this
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of many lawyers, and have produced a virtual "cottage industry" of
legal scholarship.' The issue of legal responsibility for homicide how-
country in such cases. Clemency efforts on behalf of women who have been convicted of killing
their batterers in a number of states has drawn still more attention to such cases, creating national
controversy. See Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 38; see also
Brenda Ads & Gloria Killian, Justice: One Woman's Perspective, 2 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 1 (1992); Mary E. Greenwald & Mary-Ellen Manning, When Mercy Seasons Justice:
Commutation for Battered Women Who Kill, 38 BOSTON B.J. 3 (1994) (discussing the
"Framingham Eight," a nationally recognized group of battered women imprisoned in Massachu-
setts for killing their batterers); Gloria Killian, Equal Justice for Some, 2 S. CAL REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 5 (1992); Battered Women, Battered Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1991, at Al;
Double Victory for Feminists: Maryland Governor William D. Schaefer Signs Pro-Abortion Law
and Grants Clemency for 8 Women Convicted of Killing Men Who Battered Them, TIME, Mar. 4,
1991, at 53; Tamar Lewin, More States Study Clemency for Women Who Killed Abusers, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1991, at A19; Tamar Lewin, When Justice Goes Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
1989, at 7(17); David Margolick, Court Allows Defense to Call Experts on Battered Women,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1984, at Al; David Margolick, When Battered Wives Kill, Does the Law
Treat Them Fairly?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1983, at 4(8); Andi Rierden, Citing Abuse, Women
Ask for Clemency in Killings, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1991, at Al; Margot Slade, Justice is
Stretched to Allow Wider Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1988, at B5; Jill Smolowe, When
Violence Hits Home, TIME, July 4, 1994 (cover story).
These cases have also had broad international interest. For example, in Lavallee v. The
Queen, 55 C.C.C.3d 97 (Supreme Court of Canada, 1990), the Canadian Supreme Court held
that expert testimony on battering was relevant to a battered woman's self-defense case. See, e.g.,
Martha Shaffer, R. v. Lavallee-A Review Essay, 22 OTTOWA L. REV. 607 (1990). In England,
there have been numerous cases. See Aileen McColgan, In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill,
13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 508 (1993); Donald Nicolson, Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination,
Gender Construction and Battered Women Who Kill, 3 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 185 (1995); Kath-
erine O'Donovan, Defences for Battered Women Who Kill, 18 J.L. & Soc. 219 (1991); Katherine
O'Donovan, Law's Knowledge: The Judge, the Expert, the Battered Woman and Her Syndrome,
24 J. L. & Soc. 427 (1993). I have also been consulted about cases in Central and Eastern Europe
and in Australia and New Zealand.
2. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BOCHNAK, WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1981) [hereinafter WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES]; CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN
WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1987); THE PUBLIC NA-
TURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994); Linda L.
Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-
American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 5 Wis. L. REV. 1003 (1995); Linda L.
Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a Governor's Use of the Clem-
ency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 1 (1994); Elisabeth
Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman's Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough: The Battered Woman as
Vigilante, 4 AM. J. GENDER & L. 141 (1995); Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testi-
mony: Ideas Toward the Representation of Battered Women Who Kill, 9 WOMEN'S Ris. L. REP.
227 (1986); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women 82 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Phyllis Crocker, The
Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ.
121 (1985); Michael Dowd, Battered Women: A Perspective on Injustice, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN'S
L.J. 1 (1993); Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redefinition, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191 (1993); Joan H. Krause, Of Merciful Justice and Justi-
fied Mercy: Commuting the Sentences of Battered Women Who Kill, 46 FL. L. REV. 699 (1994);
Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Re-
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ever, is not solely of theoretical interest; it affects thousands of women
in this country who are battered and who daily face the danger of
death because of inadequate social resources and the state's resulting
failure to protect them.3 As evidenced by the enormous public attention
form Proposals, 140 U. PENN. L. REv. 379 (1991); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Bat-
tered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991); Kym C. Miller,
Abused Women Abused By the Law: The Plight of Battered Women in California and a Proposal
for Revising the California Self-Defense Law, 3 REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 303 (1994); Richard
A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REv.
371 (1993); Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the
Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL L. REv. 45; Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-
Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Self-
Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 195
(1986); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex-Bias in the Law of Self-
Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 623 (1980); Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan Jordan, Repre-
sentation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4
WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 148 (1978); Symposium, Reconceptualizing Violence Against Women By
Intimate Partners: Critical Issues, 58 ALBANY L. REV. 1 (1995); Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered
Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETMIcs & PUB. POL'Y 321 (1992);
Walker et al., Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. Rv. 1 (1982); Kent M. Wil-
liams, Using Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence WTith a Self-Defense Strategy in Minnesota,
10 LAW & INEQUALITY 107 (1991); Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1574 (1993).
3. Battered women's advocates have long noted the inadequacy of legal and medical re-
sponses to battering. See LARRY L. TIrrT, BATTERING OF WOMEN: THE FAILURE OF INTERVEN-
TION AND THE CASE FOR PREVENTION (1993). In 1993, for example, out of a total of 23,271
murders and nonnegligent homicides, 1531 women were reported by law enforcement agencies as
having been killed by their male partners. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTICs-1994 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L.
Pastor et al. eds.). Conversely, 591 men were killed in the same year by female partners. Id. Most
scholarly and empirical research indicates that a woman's leaving her abuser is directly related to
an escalation of violence by the abuser that can be lethal. See Mary Ann Dutton-Douglas &
Dorothy Dionne, Counseling and Shelter Services for Battered Women, in WOMAN BATTERING:
POLICY RESPONSES, at 113, 121 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991) (citing studies by Berk, Newton &
Berk, 1986; Browne, 1987; and Barnard, Vera, Vera & Newman, 1982); Norman J. Brisson,
Battering Husbands: A Survey of Abusive Men, 6 VICTIMOLOGY 338 (1983). See also Mahoney,
supra note 2. The chances that a woman will kill her abuser do not similarly increase with her
separation from him. Only 9.1 % of women who killed a partner were separated from that partner
at the time. Brisson, supra. See also No Morel Stopping Domestic Violence, Ms. MAGAZINE,
Sept./Oct. 1994, at 1 (reporting that every year approximately 1,500 women and girls in the
United States are killed by their male partners, and listing the names of all the women and girls
killed by male partners in 1990 on the front and back covers of the issue). The statistics gathered
from law enforcement agencies obviously do not include unreported homicides, disappearances
which are actually homicides, or homicides that are not investigated or in which the investigations
are inconclusive. See, e.g., CONSTANCE A. BEAN, WOMEN MURDERED BY THE MEN THEY LOVED,
at 2 (1992) (noting that such murders are "seldom placed in the context of a regularly occurring
event. Every day, women are beaten to death, strangled, slashed, shot, or sent over a cliff by their
mates. We learn about only a few.").
1996]
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this issue has attracted, it also raises fundamental questions for the
society at large.
My involvement with these issues as lawyer, teacher, and scholar
for the last twenty years provides the context for this article.4 I have
explored the problem of gender-bias in the criminal law within an
equality framework' focusing on the need for women's experiences of
battering to be presented in the courtroom in order to guarantee their
equal rights to trial.6 I have also examined obstacles to implementation
of equality.7 However, in the many settings in which I have done this
work- whether in court, in training defense lawyers to handle these
cases, educating judges to hear them, teaching law students, giving
presentations to law teachers or others concerned with these issues,
reading the scholarly literature, or talking with the media, one theme
has been consistent-an extraordinary degree of public misunderstand-
ing concerning cases of battered women who kill their assailants. While
public misunderstanding takes different forms, claims made by bat-
tered women to explain their actions as shaped by their experiences of
abuse are commonly perceived as "special pleading" and are not under-
stood within an equality framework.
This article examines some misconceptions and identifies their
source as a deep societal resistance to perceiving the circumstances of
battered women, and particularly the circumstances of battered women
who kill their assailants, as implicating issues of gender equality.8 I
4. I was co-counsel the first case that raised the issue of gender-bias in shaping criminal
defenses and excuses, State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d. 548 (Wash. 1977), and, as amicus curiae,
argued the need for admissibility of expert testimony on battering, State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d. 364
(N.J. 1984). I have recently testified as an expert in a habeas corpus proceeding raising claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in a homicide case involving a defendant with a history of bat-
tering. Foreshaw v. Commissioner of Correction, No. CV94-0530489 (Sup. Ct., New London,
Conn.). In addition, I have consulted with many lawyers on these cases in the United States and
in other countries. See supra note 1.
5. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and
Agency, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23
CoNN. L. REv. 973 (1991); Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 2; Schneider, Equal
Rights, supra note 2; Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women, supra note 2.
6. Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 2; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Hearing
Women Not Being Heard: On Carol Gilligan's Getting Civilized and the Complexity of Voice, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1994); Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 2; Schneider,
Equal Rights, supra note 2; Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women, supra note 2.
7. Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 2; Schneider, Describing and Chang-
ing, supra note 2.
8. This symposium and consequently this article focus on heterosexual battering relation-
ships. Although much of this analysis is applicable to situations in which gay men or lesbians are
battered and kill their batterers, see, e.g., Carla M. Da Luz, A Legal and Social Comparison of
[Vol. 57:477
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suggest that resistance to equality can be seen in legal representation,
judicial treatment, and scholarly analysis. Many lawyers who are han-
dling these admittedly complex and challenging cases are not consider-
ing them within an equal rights framework and are consequently not
doing a sufficiently thoughtful job of grappling with the legal issues.
The severity of the problem of legal representation is manifested in the
large number of postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel claims
actually asserted by battered women defendants,9 the even larger num-
ber of potential claims that might be asserted, and in the many clem-
Heterosexual and Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Similar Inadequacies in Legal Recognition and
Response, 4 S. CAL REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 251 (1994) (noting general similarities in the
experience of and response to abuse in gay and heterosexual relationships), there are other dynam-
ics which might also play a role in those cases which deserve greater attention than is possible
here. See generally BARBARA HART, NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN
BATTERING, at 189 (1984) (listing "homophobic control," i.e., threatening to "out" a partner,
among other examples of experiences of battering particular to lesbian relationships, as forms of
abusive control); DAVID ISLAND & PATRICK LETELLIER, MEN WHO BEAT THE MEN WHO LOVE
THEM: BATrERED GAY MEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, at 9 (1991) ("The taboo overlay of 'gay'
onto already taboo 'domestic violence' explains a basic reason why no useful statistics have ever
been gathered on gay men's domestic violence."); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Les-
bian Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567, 584 (1990)
(arguing that "[d]omestic violence in feminist legal theory is not necessarily applicable to lesbian
legal theory because feminist legal theory is often based upon heterosexist assumptions."). For
articles dealing with battered gay men and lesbians who kill, see Denise Bricker, Fatal Defense:
An Analysis of Battered Woman's Syndrome Expert Testimony for Gay Men and Lesbians Who
Kill Abusive Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1379 (1993); David S. Dupps, Battered Lesbians: Are
They Entitled to a Battered Woman Defense?, 29 J. FAM. L. 879 (1991); Angela West,
Prosecutorial Activism: Confronting Heterosexism in a Lesbian Battering Case, 15 HARV.
WOMEN'S LU. 249 (1992).
9. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims have been brought by battered women based on
faulty advice regarding plea bargains or the defendant testifying, see State v. Scott, 1989 WL
90613 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1988), attorney failure to
present evidence and testimony that could have assisted the jury to understand and eradicate
commonly held myths and misconceptions about battering; State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Gfeller, 1987 WL 14328 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987), see People
v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); see State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220;
Martin v. State, 501 So. 2d 1313 (FI. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), failure to offer jury instructions on
battering; Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Miller, 634
A.2d 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), see Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989);
Commonwealth v. Singh, 539 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Commonwealth v. Tyson, 526
A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), failure to investigate evidence of battering, see also People v.
Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), choice and use of available defenses, see State v.
Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161 (Wis. 1983), opening statements indicating a defense involving evidence
of battering which was not followed with any such evidence, see State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d
220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991), and the attorney's self-interest interfering with the effectiveness of
his performance, see Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1988). See generally Gregory G. Sarno,
Annotation, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Battered Spouse Syndrome as Defense to Homi-
cide or Other Criminal Offense, 18 A.L.R. 5th 871 (1994).
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ency petitions for battered women being filed around the country.' 0
Many judges have also failed to understand the framework of equality
in their application of the law to cases of battered women who kill.
Many legal scholars make similar mistakes.
My advocacy and scholarship has been motivated by a deep con-
viction that gender-bias operates in these cases in both overt and subtle
ways, and by a determination to remedy gender-bias by sensitizing law-
yers, judges and other scholars to the issues that are presented in these
cases. In earlier articles, I examined the problems faced by battered
women raising self-defense claims in the context of equal rights to
trial" and the particular dilemmas posed by expert testimony on bat-
tering to implementation of equality.12 I have also explored broader
theoretical issues that are presented by these cases: the dialectical in-
terrelationship of law and social movement practice that has shaped the
assertion of battered women's equal rights to trial,13 the false dichot-
omy between views of battered women as exclusively victims or
agents, 4 and the contradictions of using law to both "describe" the
complexity of women's experiences and simultaneously help to change
social perceptions of those experiences.' 5 Here, I build on these theoret-
ical frameworks and, in light of recent case law, legislation, law reform
efforts and legal scholarship, identify continuing obstacles to implemen-
tation of battered women's equal rights to trial. This article is part of a
larger project in which I explore these issues in greater depth. 6 The
circumstances of battered women who kill are critical junctures for the
intersection of law and social attitudes because they trigger a national
chord of anxiety about "abuse excuse" justice and "feminazi"
vigilantism. 17
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Clemency cases are discussed in greater de-
tail, infra part IV.
11. Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 2; Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note
2; Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women, supra note 2.
12. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 2.
13. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from
the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); Schneider, Describing and Changing,
supra note 2.
14. Schneider, False Dichotomy, supra note 5; Schneider, Particularity and Generality,
supra note 2; Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 2.
15. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 2.
16. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, FEMINIST LAWMAKING, SOCIAL CHANGE AND WOMAN-
ABUSE (forthcoming).
17. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER CoP-OUTS, SOB STO-
RIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994). Alan Dershowitz asserts that, while some battered
women are legally justified in killing their abusers, it was these cases that first sparked his fear
[Vol. 57:477
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Most of the other contributions to this symposium focus only on
the theoretical aspects of the issue of self-defense and relations of dom-
ination presented by the particular circumstances of battered women.18
This article examines legal and public misunderstandings concerning
battered women charged with killing their assailants and the implica-
tions of these misunderstandings for both legal theory and legal prac-
tice. I explore both theoretical misconceptions and legal practice
problems, reflected in legal representation and judicial decisionmaking
in cases of battered women who kill and in academic treatment of the
subject of battered women who kill.
II. THE CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM: EQUAL RIGHTS TO TRIAL
The insight that first generated legal work on this issue almost
twenty years ago was that, for a variety of different reasons, women
who were battered and faced criminal charges for homicide or assault
of their assailant were likely to be denied equal rights to trial, that is,
equal rights to present the circumstances of their acts in the framework
of the criminal law.19 The equal rights problem in this context flows
from an equal rights problem in the criminal law generally: what Ste-
phen Schulhofer has described as the fact that "the criminal justice
system is dominated (incontrovertibly so) by a preoccupation with men
and male perspectives." 0 The equal rights problem for battered women
who kill has many sources: widespread views of women who act vio-
that the "abuse excuse," a "legal tactic by which criminal defendants claim a history of abuse as
an excuse for violent retaliation," id. at 3 is "quickly becoming a license to kill and maim." Id.
According to Professor Dershowitz, acceptance of the "abuse excuse" "is dangerous to the very
tenets of democracy, which presuppose personal accountability for choices and actions. It also
endangers our collective safety by legitimating a sense of vigilantism that reflects our frustration
over the apparent inability of law enforcement to reduce the rampant violence that engulfs us."
Id. at 4; see also Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUMT. L. REv. 304 n.100 (1995) (attributing the popularization of the term
"feminazi" to the television and radio commentator, Rush Limbaugh); Maguigan, supra note 2,
at 384 (noting "dominant portrayal of the typical battered woman homicide defendant as a
vigilante").
18. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57
U. PiTr. L. REv. 553 (1996); Arthur Ripstein, Self-Defense and Equal Protection, 57 U. PITT. L.
R V. 685 (1996).
19. See Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 2; Schneider & Jordan, Representation of
Women, supra note 2. For a more recent analysis raising related issues concerning denial of bat-
tered women's rights to present a defense with respect to expert testimony on "battered woman
syndrome," see Erich D. Anderson & Anne Read-Anderson, Constitutional Dimensions of the
Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 Omo ST. L.J. 363 (1992).
20. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. Rv.
2151, 2153 (1995).
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lently, particularly against intimates, as "monsters,"' 21 commonly held
myths and misconceptions about battered women (that they ask for or
provoke the violence, for example 22), gender-bias in the concept of rea-
21. See, e.g., Ayyildiz, supra note 2, at 146:
[The battered woman] is both a law-abiding hero and a law-breaking villain. . . . She has,
often for many years, abided by the law, taking abuse without retaliation. She has often
turned to the justice system for help, generally to no avail. Yet when she finally strikes and
defends herself, it is she who becomes the villain, the pariah disrupting home and hearth.
She is the murderous monster.
Id.
The particular horror with which women who dare to behave as law-breaking agents, rather
than passive victims of crime are viewed is seen in early criminological research on women. See
Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 80, 86 n.79 (1994) (describing criminology's construction of the female criminal as ". . . a
monster. Her normal sister is kept in the paths of virtue by many causes, such as maternity, piety,
weakness, and when these counter influences fail, and a woman commits a crime, we may con-
clude that her wickedness must have been enormous before it could triumph over so many obsta-
cles." (citing CESARE LOMBROSO & WILLIAM FERRERO, THE FEMALE OFFENDER 152 (1895)). Not
surprisingly, the law has traditionally viewed husband-killing as a crime that strikes at the root of
all civil government, threatening a basic conception of traditional society. Schneider, Equal
Rights, supra note 2, at 628-9 n.34. Blackstone noted that
if the baron kills his feme it is the same as if he had killed a stranger, or any other person;
but if the feme kills her baron, it is regarded by the laws as a much more atrocious crime,
as she not only breaks through the restraints of humanity and conjugal affection, but
throws off all subjection to the authority of her husband. And therefore the law denomi-
nates her crime a species of treason, and condemns her to the same punishment as if she
had killed the king. And for every species of treason . . . the sentence of women was to be
drawn and burnt alive.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 418 n. 103 (R. Welsh & Co. ed. 1897).
So clearly has the line between good and evil been drawn for women, that even noncriminal
behavior is seen as calculated evil when conducted by women, while the same behavior by a man
is viewed as merely the result of immaturity or boyish restlessness. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Di-
vorce Law, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis: In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, 38 UCLA L. REv.
1483, 1509 (1991) (noting that a man who leaves or betrays his family is commonly depicted as
an "irresponsible child," while the woman who leaves or betrays her family is "viewed in an
entirely different light. She is the psychological equivalent of the mother who abandons; she is a
monster."). Indeed, the view of woman as evil has even deeper roots in many religious and cul-
tural traditions. It has been argued that one object of law and other forms of organized power has
historically been the subjugation of woman as subjugation of evil in its most "monstrous" and
powerful form. See, e.g., Stephen P. Wink & Walter Wink, Domination, Justice and the Cult of
Violence, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 341, 357 (1994) (exploring the role of domination violence in the
development of human societies and law, and noting that in many creation myths "a war god
residing in the sky-Wotan, Zeus, or Indra, for example-fights a decisive battle with a female
divine being, usually depicted as a monster or dragon residing in the sea or abyss (representing
chaos). Having vanquished the original Enemy by war and murder, the male victor fashions a
cosmos from the female monster's corpse. Cosmic order is thus derived from the violent suppres-
sion of the feminine and is mirrored in the social order by the subjugation of women to men.").
22. See LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES, at 124-25 (1988) (offering a his-
torical analysis of battering as a political and social phenomenon with real consequences in indi-
vidual lives and noting that prior to the women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s, battered
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sonableness23, in societal perceptions of appropriate self-defense, and in
application of the elements of self-defense, imminent or immediate
danger and proportionality, 24 and deeply held cultural attitudes that
pathologize women generally and battered women particularly.25 Based
on the confluence of these factors, the argument was that battered
women who killed were more likely to be viewed as crazy than reasona-
ble; thus they were likely to face substantial hurdles in asserting self-
defense and to be limited in the range of defense options available at
women were often pathologized; when women began to speak out about their subordination gener-
ally, battered women were characterized as "provoking" the violence); ANGELA BROWNE, BAT-
TERED WOMEN WHO KILL 16 (1983) (noting that "male respondents who assault partners in
serious premarital relationships often insist they were 'goaded' into the violence"); SUSAN
SCHECHTER: WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVE-
MENT 127 (1983) (noting that researchers' characterization of the dynamics of violence against
women have "profoundly disturbing implications. By never condemning the violence, the authors
sanction it. The husband's main problem is his weakness, not his assaultiveness. Moreover, the
woman not only deserves the violence because of her own aggression and coldness, but also needs
and causes it for her psychic well-being. If she only fulfilled her feminine role more adequately
and demurely, she would not provoke his rage."); Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 2, at 625.
23. A. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 18 (1930) ("in all that mass of
authorities which bears upon this branch of the law [the reasonableness standard], there is no
single mention of the reasonable woman."); see also Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal
Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398
(1992) (discussing the similar difficulties women face in the legal concept of reasonableness in the
areas of rape and sexual harassment); Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 2; Maguigan, supra
note 2, at 413.
24. See Maguigan, supra note 2, at 382, 414-19 (arguing that gender-disparate application
of the rules of sef-defense by judges pose a greater problem for women who kill their batterers
than do the rules themselves, although these women have a better chance at admitting evidence
and jury instructions regarding the context in which the killing occurred in jurisdictions with an
"imminent" rather than "immediate" danger proximity requirement, and in jurisdictions that
have rejected the "like force" proportionality requirement in favor of a broader consideration of
context); Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 2 (discussing gender bias in the elements of self-
defense).
25. See Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 2, at 636 n.73 (noting that "women have been
viewed as 'disabled' by their lack of logic," and that a number of legal textbooks continue to place
problems relating to women in the law in sections devoted to 'idiots and lunatics.'). See also
TnFF, supra note 3, at 97-102 ("clinicians also 'discovered' that the hospitalized survivors of
battering had pathological personality characteristics. Battered women were described as either
aggressive, masochistic, and immature or as anxious and depressed. This perspective fostered the
assertion that battered women were responsible for their own victimization and that only women
with specific pathological characteristics were battered." (citations omitted)); GORDON, supra
note 22, at 123 ("Where the violence was directly named by the women, social workers sought to
probe 'deeper.'. . . These analyses became psychologized, or psychiatric. . . . Masochism was a
repeated diagnosis."); SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 127 (noting that researchers have character-
ized the battered woman as one who "needs and causes [male violence] for her psychic well-
being.").
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trial." The goal of this work was to expand defense options in order to
equalize women's rights to trial and afford women equal opportunity to
present an effective defense. There was no claim that all battered
women were entitled to self-defense, or that there should be a special
defense for battered women, either as self-defense or as a special "bat-
tered woman defense." To the contrary, the argument was that bat-
tered women, like all criminal defendants, had to be included within
the traditional framework of the criminal law, in order to guarantee
their equal rights to trial.
Those insights have now generated much legal scholarship,2" case
law29 and statutory reform. 80 Unfortunately, much subsequent work is
26. See, e.g., CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN. SELF-DE-
FENSE, AND THE LAW 4 (1989) (battered women face bias in presenting a self-defense case);
WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES, supra note 2 at 4 (battered women's defense options have been
limited due to bias); Julie Blackman, Emerging Images of Severely Battered Women and the
Criminal Justice System, 18 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 121, 128 (1990), reprinted in DEFENDING
BATTERED WOMEN IN CRIMINAL CASES (Section of Criminal Justice and the Division for Profes-
sional Education, American Bar Association, 1992), at 28 (noting that "the criminal justice sys-
tem, with laws that presume stranger-to-stranger violence, is ill-suited to deal with women defend-
ants whose lives are laced through with desperation, fear and violence perpetrated by an
intimate."); Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in
Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 121, 123, 126 (1985) (critical of the treatment of battered
women under the law of self-defense, and calling for the development of a "reasonable woman"
standard); Kit Kinports, Comment, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L.
REV. 393, 416 (1988) (critical of the application of self-defense law to battered women and calling
for a "reasonable battered woman" standard); Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and
the Problem of Transitiorn Perspectives of Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CH. LEGAL F. 23,
37 (calling for evidentiary rules that permit expert testimony on battering); Mahoney, supra note
2, at 6 (noting that "[1]egal pressures ... distort perceptions of violence in ways that create real
problems for [battered] women."); Rosen, supra note 2 at 376 (calling for a modification of the
imminence requirement to permit the jury to determine whether deadly force was "necessary");
Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 2, at 623; Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women,
supra note 2 at 149 (arguing that gender stereotypes prevent equal application of the law to
battered women who kill); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 Soc.
PHIL. & POL'Y 105, 116-30 (1990) (discussing assumptions in battered woman homicide cases);
Walter Steele & Christine Sigman, Reexamining the Doctrine of Self-Defense to Accommodate
Battered Women, 18 AM. J. CiaM. L. 169, 175-6 (1991) (arguing that the "objective" standard of
reasonableness in the law of self-defense ignores the experiences of battered women).
27. See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 2; Schneider, Equal Rights, supra
note 2; Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women, supra note 2; see e.g., WOMEN'S SELF
DEFENSE CASES, supra note 2, at 4 ("We do not argue for a separate legal standard for women.");
Maguigan supra note 2, at 426-27 n. 169 ("By the offer of battered-woman syndrome expert
testimony, a defendant does not assert her entitlement to a completely new defense.").
28. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Maguigan, supra note 2, at 467 (listing appellate opinions from all fifty states
used in an analysis of those opinions, culled from cases cited by authors who proposed redefinition
of self-defense jurisprudence, cases cited in law review articles, comments, and notes, books, trea-
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premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of the original argu-
ments, and assumes that pleas of self-defense or a special "battered
woman defense" were being argued as appropriate in all cases of bat-
tered women who kill their assailants.81 Although some of this scholar-
ship and law reform effort is well-intentioned, it misses the crucial in-
sight that has shaped this work: the particular facts and circumstances
of each case must be evaluated in light of the general problem of gen-
der-bias in order to ensure an individual woman's equal rights to trial.
This is, as Stephen Schulhofer puts it, a "feminism of process and
particulars."32
tises, practice manuals, periodicals, and newsletters addressing issues presented by the homicide
trials of battered women, and cases of battered women who killed their batterers based on an
independent search); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (listing appeals or postconvic-
tion efforts to vacate convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel).
30. Some reform efforts in the law of self-defense have advocated special legislation ad-
dressing the admissibility of expert testimony on battering. See, e.g., CAL Ev. CODE § 1107
(1995) (expert testimony on "battered women's syndrome" admissible by either side in a criminal
case); Ky. REv. STATS. ANN. § 503.050 (1994) (any evidence of abuse or domestic violence by
person against whom defendant is charged with using physical force is admissible); LA. CODE
EVID. ANN. art. 404(A)(2)(a) (West 1995) ("expert's opinion as to the effects of the prior assault-
ive acts on the accused's state of mind is admissible" in criminal case); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (1995) ("battered spouse syndrome" evidence, including expert testimony,
admissible to explain defendant's state of mind or motive in perfect or imperfect self-defense);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 23E (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996) (evidence of battering, including
expert testimony, admissible in self-defense, duress, or "accidental harm" defenses); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 563.033(1) (West Supp. 1994) ("battered spouse syndrome" evidence admissible in self-
defense); Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Anderson 1993) ("battered woman syndrome" evi-
dence admissible in self-defense as to imminence element); Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2945.39.2
(Anderson 1993) ("battered woman syndrome" expert testimony admissible as evidence of impair-
ment of reason in insanity defense); NEv. Rav. STAT. § 48.061 (Michie 1996) ("Evidence of
domestic violence" admissible to show defendant's state of mind for excuse defense, or toward the
establishment of self-defense); TEx. CrIM. PRO. CODE ANN. § 38.36 (b)(1) & (2) (West Supp.
1996) see also Banks v. State, 608 A.2d 1249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (applying MD. CODE
ANN, CTS. & JuD. PROc. § 10-916, and restricting the definition of battered spouse); State v.
Donner, 645 N.E.2d 165 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (applying Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.06, and
restricting the definition of "battered woman"); Maguigan, supra note 2, at 459 (discussing LA.
CODE EviD. ANN. art. 404(A) (West 1990); Sue Osthoff, Defending Battered Women: Do We
Really Need New Laws? (Fact sheet written in response to proposed state legislation, available
from the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, at 215 351-0010).
31. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614, 620 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (indicating
a belief that some jurisdictions have adopted a separate "syndrome" defense for battered women);
Commonwealth v. Ely, 578 A.2d 540, 541 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (claiming the existence of a
"'battered woman's syndrome' theory of self-defense."); Coughlin, supra note 2, at 6 (arguing
that the "defense of battered woman syndrome" does more harm than good for women). But see
Maguigan, supra note 2 (noting fundamental misunderstandings and incorrect assumptions about
the law of self-defense with regard to battered women defendants).
32. Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 2207.
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Gender-bias pervades the entire criminal process with respect to
battered women who kill. Gender-bias in perceptions of appropriate
self-defense, and the legal standard of self-defense, 3  the broader prob-
lem of choice of defense,3' and the need for expert testimony on bat-
tering"e are all interrelated. Misapprehension of gender-bias in the con-
cept of self-defense, and in judicial application of the law of self-
defense, necessarily leads to misunderstanding of the choice of defenses
that may be available in any particular case-which may have consti-
tutional implications. 6 And, of course, the substance of the defense
necessarily shapes the content of any testimony, particularly expert tes-
timony, that might be proffered in support of that defense.
Scholarship, litigation, and legal reform efforts over the last
twenty years should have deepened our understanding of the complex-
ity of these cases and underscored the severity of the problem of bat-
tering, the absence of state protection for battered women and the
problems of unequal trial that women who are battered face. We now
recognize that male physical violence is part of a larger framework of
power and coercive control over women,37 a pattern of physical and
psychological abuse, of totalizing subordination which includes restric-
tion of fundamental rights of freedom, choice, and autonomy. This as-
pect of male violence has been trivialized because of its location in the
intimate relationship. Significantly, when this relationship is taken out
of its "family" or" private" context, and characterized within a more
"public" generic framework such as torture,3 8 terrorism in the home, 9
33. See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 2, at 227 (arguing that evidence of
battering is relevant under both an "objective" and a "subjective" standard of self-defense, and
that, regardless of which standard a jurisdiction enunciates, "it has been recognized that these
characterizations of subjective and objective are poles on a continuum, since the jury must find
that the actor acted reasonably under either approach.")
34. See infra part III.
35. See generally Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 2, at 197.
36. Battered women may be denied the opportunity to present a defense, and thus denied
equal rights to trial.
37. See, e.g., SUSAN SCHECHTER, GUIDELINES FOR MENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONERS IN Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 4 (1987) (first use of the term "coercive control" to describe battering);
Dutton, supra note 2; Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syn-
drome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REv. 973, 975 (1995).
38. Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as
Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 291, 295 (1994) (arguing that domestic violence should be
considered violative of international human rights standards condemning torture).
39. Isabel Marcus, Refraining Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home, in THE PUBLIC
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE, supra note 2, at 11 (redefining "domestic violence" as "terrorism




regime of private tyranny,40 being held hostage,41 involuntary servi-
tude,42 hostile domestic environment, 43 or human rights violation,44 the
moral and political dimensions of domestic violence move into sharper
focus. 45 We know that women's assertion of independence and separa-
tion exacerbates the lethality of male violence,46 and that many women
who leave their abusers are at greater risk of being seriously injured or
killed. 47 We know that states that have fewer resources devoted to bat-
tered women have a higher rate of homicides committed by battered
women. 48 There is wide recognition of the limitations of legal remedies
in providing safety to battered women, whether orders of protection,
mandatory arrest policies, or antistalking laws, and the general failure
of the state to protect battered women. 49 We understand that a history
of battering, previously invisible, can now be seen in women's criminal
40. Jane Maslow Cohen, Regimes of Private Tyranny, 57 U. PTT. L. Rv. 757 (1996)
(placing intimate violence within framework of political tyranny).
41. State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 584 (Kan. 1988) (Herd, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority should have accepted a battered woman's claim of self-defense, comparing her situa-
tion to that of a hostage, in which case the court would accept the same argument); Anthony J.
Sebok, Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand Too Much?, 57 U. PiTT. L. REv. 725,
752 (1996).
42. Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and
the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMnNisM 207 (1992) (arguing that extreme domestic
violence should be considered involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment).
43. Martha Chamallas, Hostile Domestic Environments, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 809 (1996)
(placing intimate violence within framework of hostile workplace environment).
44. Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights
Issue, 58 ALB. L. REv. 1119, 1120 (1995) (arguing that international law should recognize domes-
tic violence as a human rights issue because it violates basic human rights principles of the inher-
ent dignity and equal worth of all human beings, the right to freedom from fear and want, and
equal rights of men and women).
45. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CoNN. L. Rav. 973, 976-977
(1986) (arguing that the distinction between "private" and "public" spheres has permitted selec-
tive application of the law which has protected male domination in the "private" sphere).
46. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Mahoney, supra note 2.
47. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
48. Angela Browne & Kirk R. Williams, Exploring the Effect of Resource Availability and
the Likelihood of Female-Perpetrated Homicides, 23 LAW & Soc. REv. 75 (1989) (availability
of legal and extralegal resources is associated with a decline in female-perpetrated homicides;
findings suggest that legal and extralegal interventions can provide nonviolent alternatives for vic-
tims of male partner abuse).
49. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence III, New
State and Federal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1528, 1529 (1993) (dis-
cussing the development and the shortcomings of these and other efforts in the law to address
battering, and noting that one reason many of these efforts fall short of the goal of ending woman
abuse is "because attitudes that endorse the historical subordination of women remain embedded
in both the male psyche and the response systems of society.").
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conduct in a wide variety of circumstances, 50 and that many women
who are in jail on charges that are seemingly unrelated to battering
have been battered. 51
There is also a fuller empirical basis on which to conclude that
cases involving battered women who kill fall within traditional
frameworks of defenses or excuses, 52 but are nonetheless viewed as dif-
ferent or exceptional by judges who apply the law to these cases,53 and
that battered women of color face particular hurdles in this regard."
The constitutional impact of denial of equal rights to trial has been
detailed.55 Recent social and cultural experience continues to confirm
50. It has been estimated that 80-85% of incarcerated women are incarcerated as a result
of their affiliation with an abusive partner. Statistics Packet, National Clearinghouse for the De-
fense of Battered Women, Philadelphia, Pa. (3d ed. 1994); see also Russ Immarigeon, Few Diver-
sion Programs Are Offered Female Offenders, 11 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J. 10 (1987) (citing
same statistics). Women who behave violently toward men are viewed by society with particular
horror and outrage, and this emotional reaction is often reflected in sentencing. See Denno, supra
note 21; see also Myrna S. Raeder, Gender Issues in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 8(3) CRIM. JusT. 21, 60-62 (1993) (noting that women who are
low-level carriers in drug cases are often coerced by boyfriends and husbands into drug activity,
and generally receive harsh sentences); see generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Meaning of Gender
Equality in the Criminal Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 13 (1995).
51. There are a range of research results on the number of women in prison who were
abused before imprisonment. The lowest estimates, by the Department of Justice, are that 22% of
women in federal prisons, and 43 % of women in state prisons have been battered. Other research-
ers have estimated that as many as 85 % of incarcerated women have been battered. Karl Ras-
mussen, Executive Director of the Women's Prison Association in New York, has stated that 85 %
of the women he has seen would not have gone to prison in the first place, if it were not for their
involvement with abusive male criminals. Statistics Packet, National Clearinghouse for the De-
fense of Battered Women, Philadelphia, Pa. (3d ed. 1994).
52. Maguigan, supra note 2 at 391-97.
53. Id.
54. See BETH E. PiCmIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME (1996) (describing the experiences of bat-
tered African American women incarcerated in New York City and the double-bind in which they
find themselves due to societal gender roles, racism, and abuse by their partners); Ammons,
Mules. Madonnas, supra note 2, at 1006 (African American women are less likely to be consid-
ered 'real' battered women because of racism and stereotypes about battered women); Kimberle
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991) ("Where systems of race, gender, and class
domination converge, as they do in the experiences of women of color, intervention strategies
based solely on the experiences of women who do not share the same class or race backgrounds
will be of limited help to women who because of race and class face different obstacles."); Jenny
Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Ori-
gin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (1995) (describing particular ex-
periences of Latinas battered by Latinos); Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Ap-
proval of Violence Against Women in the Pacific Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43
STAN. L. REv. 1311 (1991) (discussing the "cultural defense" asserted by some batterers, which
claims that in their own cultures abuse of women is acceptable).
55. See Andersen & Read-Andersen, supra note 19. Although the authors focus on the
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that women who act violently toward men, even in self-defense,
whether in the movies (Thelma and Louise) or in life (Lorena Bobbitt),
are viewed with particular horror.58
Despite these recent developments that support and indeed
strengthen the equal rights perspective, there is considerable resistance
on the part of legal scholars, lawyers, judges, the media, and the public
at large to perceiving the moral and legal circumstances of battered
women as implicating issues of equality. Legal arguments in battered
women's cases are routinely viewed as a kind of "special pleading"
which claim special lenient treatment for battered women. Indeed,
some well-intentioned lawyers, legislators, legal scholars and judges
have made legal arguments, developed legislation and written articles
and judicial opinions that assert "battered women's," or "battered wo-
man syndrome" defenses or claims, whether as the basis for claims of
self-defense, 57 admissibility of expert testimony,5 8 or for a special cause
of action in tort.59 This dilemma is a familiar one when gender discrim-
constitutional implications of exclusion of expert witness testimony on "battered woman syn-
drome," their argument and observations are consistent with the equality framework defined by
the early work on women's self-defense in other respects. They argue that the Sixth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution is implicated whenever a battered woman attempts to introduce expert
testimony to assist the trier of fact in understanding her experience as a battered woman and the
role that experience may have played in the reasonableness of her acts.
56. See Susan N. Herman, Thelma and Louise and Bonnie and Jean: Images of Women as
Criminals, 2 S. CAL. RaV. L. & WOMEN'S SmTD. 53 (1992); Elizabeth V. Spelman & Martha
Minow, Outlaw Women: An Essay on Thelma and Louise, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 1281 (1992) see
also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 1989 WL 90613 (Del. Super. July 19, 1989) (defense attorney
referred to client's defense as "battered woman's defense."); Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261 n.4
(Nev. 1988) (defense attorney told expert he had hired to testify in trial the trial of a woman for
the shooting death of her abusive husband: "If we won this case, we'd be flying across the country
consulting. . . in special cases like this and I'd have all the work I could handle."); State v. Vigil,
794 P.2d 728, 729 (N.M. 1990) (referring to a "battered woman theory of self-defense"); Com-
monwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614, 619 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (indicating a belief that some
jurisdictions have adopted a separate "syndrome" defense for battered women); Commonwealth v.
Ely, 578 A.2d 540, 541 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (claiming the existence of a "battered woman's
syndrome theory of self-defense."); Commonwealth v. Tyson, 526 A.2d 395, 397 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987) (referring to the "defense of 'battered woman's syndrome' "); see also Coughlin, supra note
2, at 6 (arguing that the "defense of battered woman syndrome" does more harm than good for
women); But see Maguigan, supra note 2, at 382 (noting fundamental misunderstandings and
incorrect assumptions about the law of self-defense with regard to battered women defendants).
58. See sources cited supra note 30.
59. See Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) (recognizing a
tort of "battered women's syndrome"); Jewett v. Jewett, 93-20-01846-5 (Super. Ct., Spokane Co.)
(recognizing a tort of "domestic violence"); see also "Battered Woman" Tort Gains, NATIONAL
L.. Aug. 28, 1995, at A6 (reporting on Giovine v. Giovine, A-2134-94T5 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1995)
noting that Giovine marks only the third court, and the highest, in the country to recognize a tort
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ination claims are made, for the tension between equal treatment and
special treatment is inherent to the problem of equality generally, and
particularly endemic in claims of gender equality.60 But in the context
of criminal cases involving battered women as defendants, the mis-
characterization of claims of equal treatment as special treatment is
especially problematic. Battered women's actions in these cases are
widely perceived to be outside the traditional justification framework of
the criminal law; consequently, the problem of gender-bias is not only
neither addressed nor remedied, but exacerbated.
A. The Legal Framework of the Problem
Homicide is generally divided into first- and second-degree mur-
der, manslaughter, and justifiable or excusable homicide. If a homicide
is justifiable or excusable it is because special circumstances exist
which the law recognizes as justifying or excusing the defendant's acts
from criminal liability.61 Proof that a killing occurred in a sudden, pro-
voked "heat of passion" upon provocation that would cause a "reasona-
specific to battered women). But see Laughlin v. Breaux, 515 So. 2d 480 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
(declining to recognize such a tort).
60. Feminists and other modern and postmodern theorists have long recognized the inherent
discord between the need, on the one hand, to identify "differences" that define a political group,
for purposes of developing unity within the group and identifying unequal treatment of individual
group members within the dominant culture, and, on the other hand, traditional liberal concep-
tions of equality, which call for universal norms that can be applied to all individuals and groups,
regardless of particular social, historical, cultural, gender-based, or other experiences, needs, or
values. See, e.g., IRIs M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 168-72 (1990) (ar-
guing that fear of stigma now attached to differential treatment of groups flows from understand-
ing "difference" as opposition, deviation, or devaluation, and identifying equality with sameness);
Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (1990)
(noting that "the stigma of difference may be recreated both by ignoring and by focusing on it.");
Linda J. Nicholson & Nancy Fraser, Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Be-
tween Feminism and Postmodernism, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 19-38 (Linda J. Nicholson
ed., 1990) (arguing that, in an effort to focus on the particular experiences of individuals rather
than imposing "neutral" norms on all in the development of theory, much of feminist theory itself
has fallen back on essentialist claims about the nature of women or women's "universal" experi-
ence); Margaret Jane Radin, Affirmative Action Rhetoric, 9 Soc. PML. & POLY. 130, 147 (1991)
(noting that affirmative action is more likely to succeed if it is not seen as "special" treatment, but
rather as a measure to break through unjustified hierarchy based on sex or race); Schneider,
Particularity and Generality, supra note 2, at 527 (noting the "paradox" in feminist theory be-
tween the need to "particularly" describe women's individual experiences and the need to locate
those experiences within the "general" framework of oppression of women generally).
61. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW ch. 7
(1986). The classifications described in this text are general. Some jurisdictions do not divide
murder into degrees; others divide it into three degrees. Some jurisdictions also divide manslaugh-
ter into degrees, or into "voluntary" and "involuntary." Id.
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ble man to lose his self-control"6 2 is considered in most jurisdictions to
be manslaughter.63 Manslaughter is an "intermediate" crime between
murder and justifiable homicide;6 it means that the homicidal act is
not "justifiable," but, because of the circumstances of the individual, it
is "understandable" or "excusable" and therefore deserving of some
mitigation in punishment.65 Alternatively, where a defendant's belief in
the need to use force to defend herself is "reasonable," and she is not
the initial aggressor, self-defense is a "complete" defense and results in
acquittal. 66 Where her belief is honest but "unreasonable," some juris-
dictions recognize an "imperfect" self-defense, permitting a reduction
from murder to manslaughter. 67
Although the law of self-defense is argued to be universally appli-
cable, it is widely recognized that social concepts of justification have
been shaped by male experience.68 Consequently, it is now widely rec-
62. 2 LAFAVE & ScOTT, supra note 61, at 252. Most jurisdictions require the emotion
causing the "passion" that makes manslaughter "understandable" to be anger (thus requiring that
there not have been a "cooling off" period sufficient to make the provocation unreasonable), al-
though a few include fear or "terror." Id. at 255.
63. Id. at 271-2, supra note 61. 1 LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 61, at 650.
64. 2 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 61, at 251.
65. Id. at 256.
66. Id. at 271.
67. 1 LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 61, at 663. 2 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 61, at 271.
68. Familiar images of self-defense are a soldier, a man protecting his home, family, or
the chastity of his wife, or a man fighting off an assailant. Society, through its prosecutors,
juries, and judges, has more readily excused a man for killing his wife's lover than a wo-
man for killing a rapist. The acts of men and women are subject to a different set of legal
expectations and standards. The man's act, while not always legally condoned, is viewed
sympathetically. He is not forgiven, but his motivation is understood by those sitting in
judgment. . . .The law, however, has never protected a wife who killed her husband after
finding him with another woman. A woman's husband simply does not belong to her in the
same way that she belongs to him.
Schneider & Jordan, supra note 2, at 153; see also 2 LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 61, at 258-9
(noting that "it is the law practically everywhere" that a husband's discovery of his wife in the act
of adultery is sufficient provocation under the law of manslaughter, and, at one time, for a justifi-
cation defense as well). The man who kills his wife after finding her with another man is "the
paradigm example of provocation," and his conduct is widely perceived to deserve more lenient
treatment than other kinds of killings under the law. Indeed, men's killings of their wives are
"seldom recognized as belonging to the universe of 'domestic violence' killings"; conversely,
women who have killed their husbands in response to battering have raised considerable contro-
versy and are perceived to deserve harsher treatment under the law. Donna Coker, Heat of Pas-
sion and Wife Killing, 2 S. CAL REv. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 71, 73 (1992).
In a recent Maryland case involving a man who shot and killed his wife four hours after
coming home and finding her in bed with another man, the judge sentenced the man to eighteen
months in a work release program, stating that he could imagine nothing that would provoke "an
uncontrollable rage greater than this: for someone who is happily married to be betrayed in your
personal life, when you're out working to support the spouse .... I seriously wonder how many
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ognized that women defendants face substantial hurdles in pleading
self-defense.6 9 Judicial application of the standard of reasonableness
and elements of the law of self-defense, the requirement of temporal
proximity of the danger perceived by the defendant, the requirement of
equal proportionality of force used by the defendant to that used
against her by the batterer, and the duty to retreat can be particularly
problematic for battered woman defendants. 70
Alternatives to self-defense are the insanity defense and the range
of partial responsibility or impaired mental state defenses, which vary
among jurisdictions.7 1 If a defendant pleads insanity she claims that,
due to her mental condition at the time of the act, she is not guilty
because she either did not know what she was doing or that it was
wrong.7 12 The insanity defense is usually a "complete" defense, in the
sense that defendant is not legally responsible for the act committed.
However, a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity most often results
in institutionalization for an indefinite period of time.7 Some, but not
all, jurisdictions recognize partial responsibility defenses. These include
heat-of-passion manslaughter and other forms, such as intoxication. 74
In those jurisdictions that do recognize partial responsibility defenses, a
successful defense will mitigate the act and reduce a charge from mur-
der to manslaughter, for example.7 5
men married five, four years . . . would have the strength to walk away without inflicting some
corporal punishment." See She Strays, He Shoots, Judge Winks, N.Y. Tim3s, Oct. 22, 1994, at
A22. For a thoughtful discussion of this case in light of shifting social norms, see Dan M. Kahan
& Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. Rav. 269,
346 nn. 350-56 (1996).
69. See, e.g., Maguigan, supra note 2, at 385-86 (analyzing a then-comprehensive group of
appellate opinions involving battered women who killed their batterers and noting that more re-
strictive danger proximity requirements in the law of self-defense, reasonableness requirements
that exclude social context evidence, a duty to retreat, or a "like force" requirement can be partic-
ularly difficult for battered women, whether imposed by the substantive law of the jurisdiction or
gender-biased imposition of the law by trial judges).
70. Id.; see also Ripstein, supra note 18; supra notes 26, 55 and accompanying text.
71. Generally, these are intoxication, infancy, automatism, and heat-of-passion manslaugh-
ter. 2 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 61, at 427.
72. 1 LAFAVE & ScoTt, supra note 61, at 427-8.
73. Id. at 483.
74. 2 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 61, at 252.
75. 2 LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 61, at 522-3. An important distinction between insanity
and partial responsibility defenses is that, traditionally, psychological expert testimony was only
relevant to an insanity defense. A few jurisdictions that recognize partial responsibility defenses
have allowed the admission of psychological evidence without the usual insanity defense require-
ments for such testimony of notice to the prosecution and adverse examination by the prosecu-
tion's experts. This has posed particular problems for battered women in recent years. Id. at 528.
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B. The Goals of Equal Rights to Trial
When the theoretical framework of gender-bias in the law of self-
defense was developed almost twenty years ago, far less was known
about the problem of domestic violence. The fact that there even were
battered women who killed their assailants, much less the nature of the
battering experiences of these women, was not widely known. The
equal rights framework developed from the experiences of battered
women, whose stories, though hardly new, had rarely been told or
heard. Lawyers and social scientists who were sensitive to the subtleties
of gender-bias listened to the experiences of women who had been bat-
tered and who killed their assailants. 76 The particular experiences of
women who were battered, the social context of battering, and the
broader problems of gender subordination within which the particular
problem of battering had to be understood, were essential to the fram-
ing of the theory.7
Early work on equal rights to trial focused first on choice of de-
fense, because the threshold issue for defense lawyers who represent
battered women who kill is interpretation of the facts and law in order
to choose a defense. The argument was that lawyers were more likely
to rely on partial responsibility and insanity defenses for battered
women, rather than self-defense, because they play into stereotypes of
women generally, and battered women particularly, as hysterical and
irrational.7 8 Battered women who kill are likely to be seen as either
"bad" or "mad" or both, but as inappropriate claimants of self-de-
fense79 by defense counsel; these are stereotypes which the judge and
jury may share.80 The crux of self-defense is the concept of reasonable-
76. For example, the Women's Self-Defense Law Project, founded jointly by the Center for
Constitutional Rights and the National Jury Project in 1978, conducted training sessions for law-
yers and consulted on and monitored more than 100 cases. For a more detailed description of the
Project's work, see WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES, supra note 2 at xv-xvi.
77. Legal scholars, indeed contributors to this symposium, are still divided on the issue of
whether the social context of battering and the "facts" of gender subordination are even relevant
to criminal law defenses. Compare Fletcher, supra note 18, at 553 with Benjamin Zipursky, Self-
Defense, Domination, and the Social Contract, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 579, 612 (1996) and Ripstein,
supra note 18, at 686. Professor Fletcher argues that the social "facts" of abuse and gender
subordination are not relevant, while Professors Zipursky and Ripstein say they are.
78. See WolMEN's SELF-DEFENSE CASES, supra note 2, at 29; see also Maguigan, supra note
2; Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 2; Schneider, Describing and Changing,
supra note 2.
79. Nicolson, supra note 1 at 185.
80. See, e.g., Regina Schuller et. al, Jurors' Decisions in Trials of Battered Women Who
Kill: The Role of Prior Beliefs and Expert Testimony 24 J. APPuED Soc. PSYCHOL. 316 (1994)
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ness. In order for a defense lawyer to believe that a battered woman
has a credible claim of self-defense, the lawyer will first have to over-
come sex-based stereotypes of reasonableness, understand enough about
the experiences of battered women to be able to fully consider whether
the woman's actions are reasonable, and be able to listen to the wo-
man's experiences sensitive to the problems of gender-bias. The point of
the early work on gender-bias was to suggest that there might be many
cases of women charged with homicide, particularly battered women,
where self-defense was likely to be overlooked by defense counsel, but
might be appropriate and should be considered. 81 The goal was to en-
sure that the full range of defenses were available and explored for
battered women defendants, just as for all other criminal defendants.
The next step was to make sure that battered women's experiences
were heard, first by defense lawyers in the process of representation
and choice of defense, and then in the courtroom, regardless of what
defense was chosen. Thus the second emphasis of this work was the
crucial role of admission of evidence on battering, first from the woman
and others who might have observed or known about the violence, and
then from experts who might be able to explain those experiences and
assist factfinders to overcome myths and misconceptions that might im-
pede their consideration. Admission of evidence at trial concerning bat-
tering was deemed crucial, because of the view that the social relations
of domination, the history and experience of abuse, were not only rele-
vant but essential to the determination of guilt. In short, the goal was
to improve the rationality of the fact-finding process, not to have every
battered woman on trial plead self-defense. Nonetheless, the argument
(jurors who were informed about the dynamics of abuse and those exposed to expert testimony,
compared to their respective counterparts, were more believing of the battered woman's account of
what occurred in mock jury trial). See also Neil Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Is the Jury
Competent? Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONrrEMP.
PROBS. 133 (1989) (reviewing current literature on juror attitudes about battering); EWING, supra
note 2 (finding that battered women tried for killing their batterers were more likely to receive an
acquittal where an expert testified on battering); Regina Schuller, The Impact of Expert Testi-
mony Pertaining to the "Battered Woman Syndrome" on Jurors' Information Processing and
Decisions (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western Ontario) (finding that
jurors were more likely to acquit battered woman defendants where expert testimony linked the
defendant to the "battered woman syndrome," and that the more jurors endorsed myths and mis-
conceptions about battered women, the less likely they were to render a not guilty verdict, and
that males were more likely to endorse such concepts than females), cited in Vidmar & Schuller,
supra, at 142; Alana Bowman, A Matter of Justice: Overcoming Juror Bias in Prosecutions of
Batterers Through Expert Witness Testimony of the Common Experiences of Battered Women, 2
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 219 (1992).
81. See, e.g., WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES, supra note 2, at 28-29.
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for the relevance of the social context of battering in order to improve
the rationality of the fact-finding process has become confused with the
notion of a separate defense of battering in the public mind.
III. COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS
The equality framework that I have described is truly a frame-
work--a way of analyzing cases of battered women who kill-from a
perspective of gender-bias. However, themes which emerge in case law,
legal reform efforts and legal scholarship concerning these cases sug-
gest a failure to understand the insights and nuances of this approach.
First, the framework of gender-bias is either not considered or misun-
derstood as a claim for a particular defense or result, rather than a
mode of case analysis that must be applied particularly, and differently,
based on the facts of each individual case. Second, cases of battered
women are viewed in a rigid, totalistic, "all or nothing" way. For exam-
ple, arguments are made that battered women are or are not, as a class,
entitled to claim self-defense as a justification, are or not entitled to
assert an excuse, or should all be able to claim "battered woman syn-
drome" or a "battered woman" or "battered woman syndrome" de-
fense. Either all battered women are entitled or none are; but the com-
mon theme is that "they" are all the same. In this part, I offer
examples of these common misconceptions in case law, legislation, and
legal scholarship.
A. Definition of the "Battered Woman"
In a number of different ways, the term "battered woman" is in-
terpreted by judges, legislators and scholars in a rigid, static, and
highly dichotomized fashion. This has serious ramifications for cases of
battered women who kill.
First, as I have previously suggested, the term "battered woman"
itself is rigid and static, and implies that there is one model, which
excludes women with diverse experiences who do not fit a particular
mold or stereotype."2 Second, the phrase "battered woman" connotes
82. Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 2. Many women who have been
battered resist application of the term "battered woman" to themselves. Id. at 530 nn.36, 37. This
is in part because it is reductivist in experiential terms and restrictive in definitional terms:
in contrast with other descriptions of harm to women, "battered woman" describes the
victim and focuses on her qualities. A woman is-or is not-a "battered woman. . ..
[T]he term "battered woman" conjures up images of helplessness and defeat rather than
survival and resistance. Neither the term itself nor the social meaning of the term derived
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victimization, perhaps because of its association with the concept of
"battered woman syndrome."8' 3 However, women who are battered are
also survivors, active help-seekers who find little help and protection
from the state, with extraordinary abilities to strategize in order to
keep themselves and their families safe under terrible circumstances."
Third, case law and statutes in some jurisdictions limit the "definition"
of "battered woman" so that many women will not be recognized in the
eyes of the law.85 Thus, for example, some battered women who kill
have been deprived of the opportunity to seek jury instructions at trial,
from practice, describe the complexity of battered women's experiences.
Id. at 530-31. Holly Maguigan is also critical of the tendency to define the term "battered wo-
man" rigidly and narrowly. She critiques the suggestion that there should be a separate "reasona-
ble battered woman," or "reasonable woman" standard for the following reason: "The creation of
a generalized model of the battered woman, to say nothing of the battered woman who kills,
invites courts to prevent the fair trials of women who are not 'good' battered women." Maguigan,
supra note 2, at 444-45; see also Dutton, supra note 2, at 1195-96 nn.17, 18. Dutton notes that:
[A woman] may not be thought of as the "typical" battered woman if she has a history of
prostitution, for example, or if she has been observed to behave angrily, is known to abuse
her children, is trained in the use of a weapon, or is physically larger than her abusive
partner ...
[She] may be thought to have engaged in abusive behavior where she has fought back
in an attempt to protect herself against the violence and abuse.
Id. at 1195.
Some courts have been sensitive to the problem of stereotyping of battered women. For exam-
ple, in Mcmaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1992), the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's denial of a state habeas corpus for a battered woman who had been convicted of
first degree murder and conspiracy on several grounds, including the fact that the trial judge had
refused to believe that the woman, who appeared assertive at trial, was battered and had been
coerced into a defense strategy against her will by her husband. The court observed:
It is well established that battered women have several common personality traits. These
traits include low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family, and the fe-
male sex role, tremendous feelings of guilt that their marriages are failing, and the ten-
dency to accept responsibility for the batterer's actions. The presence of these characteris-
tics leads to the stereotype of the battered woman as fragile, haggard, fearful, passive,
lacking job skills, and economically dependent on her batterer. Nevertheless, the existence
of this list of traits does not mean that all battered women look and act the same. Al-
though some battered women may have some or all of these characteristics, it is entirely
possible for a battered woman not to evidence any of these characteristics.
McMaugh, 612 A.2d at 731 (citing Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372) (emphasis added).
83. Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 2, at 531.
84. See, e.g., EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 11 (1988) (arguing that women, rather than
"giving up," "respond to abuse with helpseeking efforts that are largely unmet."); Dutton, supra
note 2 at 1227-30; Stark, supra note 37 at 1000.
85. See, e.g., Banks v. State, 608 A.2d 1249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (restricting the
definition of "battered spouse" for evidentiary purposes); State v. Donner, 645 N.E.2d 165 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1994) (restricting the definition of "battered woman" for evidentiary purposes).
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or to get the issue of self-defense to the jury, because the judge decided
that they were not "real" battered women. 6
This duality can be understood as flowing from the notion of what
I have called the victimization-agency dichotomy.817 Battered women
are simplistically viewed as either "victims" or "agents." This signifi-
cantly contributes to confusion about appropriate legal defense strate-
gies for women in a number of ways. A battered woman cannot be
victimized if she is an agent or survivor; nor can she be responsible if
she is a victim. Judges and scholars reflect this dichotomized approach
in analyses that make claims about the criminal liability of battered
women in general in totalistic ways. But women who are battered and
particularly battered women who kill, are simultaneously both victims
and agents. Indeed it is the very complexity of their situations, the si-
multaneity of being both victim and agent that makes these cases so
difficult from both a moral and legal perspective. It is the more com-
plex and nuanced situation of "situated agency" that the equal rights
framework tries to grapple with in the concrete context of individual
cases. However, the way that the law has developed in this area tends
to make this more complex accommodation difficult. 8
86. See supra note 80; see also Andersen & Read-Andersen, supra note 19, at 376; Magui-
gan, supra note 2, at 381. A recent California case that has drawn some media attention illus-
trates the tendency to see battered women as completely helpless victims, and the difficulty some
have in reconciling the image of a physically or emotionally strong woman with that of the help-
less victim. One news story notes that the defendant, "a bodybuilder, wrestler, and occasional
boxer-is on trial for the shotgun slaying of her husband," and that the killing was "either the act
of a habitually violent and enraged woman or the justifiable response of a brutally battered wife."
Greg Moran, Jury Hears Scenarios of Violent Last Hours of a Stormy Marriage, SAN DIEGo
UNION-TRIBuNE, Feb. 27, 1996, at B2; see also McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1992)
(noting problem of stereotyping battered women).
87. I have described this dichotomy previously in Schneider, Describing and Changing,
supra note 2; Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 2; and Schneider, False Dichot-
omy, supra note 5.
88. For example, confusion about whether expert testimony is admissible as part of a partial
responsibility defense has caused particular problems for battered women defendants who do not
fall neatly into either the insanity or partial responsibility categories. When expert testimony on
battering is proffered, courts are split on whether notice and adverse examination requirements
apply-and, implicitly, on whether the defense being offered is really insanity, partial responsibil-
ity, or a completely separate "battered woman syndrome" defense. Some jurisdictions require no-
tice and adverse examination in partial responsibility defenses proffering expert testimony on bat-
tering, others do not, and still others limit the subject matter of the expert's testimony in these
cases. Id.; see also 1 LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 61, at 524-5. Illustrating this confusion about
what legal "slot" battered women who kill fit into, in California, where "battered woman syn-
drome" evidence is admissible by statute, CAL. EviD. CODE § 1107 (West 1995), the partial re-
sponsibility defense has been abolished. CAL PENAL CODE § 25 (West 1986); see also 1 LAFAvE
& ScoTT, supra note 61, at 527 n.36.
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Holly Maguigan's empirical analysis of judicial treatment of cases
of battered women who kill reveals this dichotomized thinking and sug-
gests the tenacity of the widespread misperception that battered women
who kill their batterers are per se inappropriate claimants of self-de-
fense.8 9 Her review of appellate opinions in cases of battered women
who killed, 0 published in 1991, suggested that this misperception flows
from two flawed assumptions about cases involving battered women
who kill as "special." First, it is assumed that these women kill sleeping
or otherwise nonconfrontational men and then claim "domestic violence
made them do it," although at least 75 % of these cases involved situa-
tions where battered women killed during an ongoing attack or under
an imminent threat.9 1 Second, it is assumed that the existing law of
self-defense cannot accommodate cases of battered women who kill
their batterers or any other cases where the fact finder must under-
stand the context of the killing in order to apply the law rationally.
Professor Maguigan concludes that the problem facing battered woman
defendants is not the law of self-defense as it currently exists, but
rather the disparate application of that law to battered women at
trial.92 Trial judges misapplied the law of self-defense primarily by
making rulings that kept evidence of the social context of battering
from the jury and by failing to instruct the jury, either adequately or at
all, on the law of self-defense and were frequently reversed on appeal.93
They seemed to make these errors in application of the law of self-
defense because of their stereotypical views of battered women as ei-
ther "vigilantes" ('bad'), or as otherwise incapable of acting reasonably
('mad') .9
B. Reasonableness and Choice of Defense
In considering whether a battered woman charged with homicide
89. Maguigan, supra note 2, at 381. One fact Professor Maguigan cites as support for her
conclusions is that the women in her study had a 40% reversal rate on their convictions, a figure
significantly higher than the national average for homicide appeals, 8.5%, according to the Na-
tional Center for State Courts. Id. at 432-33 (citing Joy A. CRAPPER & ROGER A. HANSON,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CRIMINAL AP-
PEALS: FINAL REPORT 38 (1990)).
90. Id. at 396.
91. Id. at 397 (in five percent of the cases, there was insufficient discussion of the facts to
determine whether a confrontation was occurring at the time of the killing or not).
92. Id. at 432.
93. Id. at 434-47.
94. Id. at 434-36; see also infra note 183 (discussing the "bad/mad" paradigm in Nicolson,
supra note 1, at 185).
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has a credible claim of self-defense, defense lawyers who must assist
battered women to choose a defense, and judges who rule on these
cases, confront the threshold issue of reasonableness. If the determina-
tion is that the woman's actions were not reasonable, self-defense can-
not be asserted.95 Thus, the issue of reasonableness has a critical im-
pact on the choice of defense.
Serious problems in legal representation shape the analysis and
presentation of these cases and necessarily make the determination of
reasonableness extraordinarily complex. Many lawyers representing
battered women do not understand the problems of domestic violence
and therefore cannot understand how the law applies to battered
women who kill. Defense lawyers may be misinformed about domestic
violence or lack experience in representing women who have been bat-
tered. Stereotypical thinking about available defenses may also impede
them from asking questions or from processing the information they
receive in a way which permits a full consideration of the range of
defenses which may be appropriate to the case.9 6 Since women who
have killed their partners frequently suffer memory lapse and confusion
following the incident,97 an attorney representing a battered woman
95. I argue here that reasonableness is the threshold and encompassing judgment made by
lawyers and judges in these cases. Of course, a defense lawyer or judge might decide that a bat-
tered woman was reasonable, but that the specific elements of self-defense were not met. However,
if a defense lawyer believed that the woman was acting reasonably, he or she might be more
creative in arguing how the battered woman met the problematic elements of self-defense. As a
practical matter, I suspect that a judge who determined that a battered woman was acting reason-
ably, even if some of the elements of self-defense presented in the defense case were problematic,
would also decide to give a self-defense instruction to the jury.
96. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 630 So. 2d 160, 162 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1316 (1995) (defense attorney failed to object to court's instruction on whether battering
was sufficient provocation for reduction of murder to manslaughter, and thus failed to preserve the
issue for appeal); Neelley v. State, 642 So. 2d 494 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1316 (1995) (defense counsel's failure to present expert testimony on domestic violence and pub-
licity contract with defendant in high-profile case did not constitute ineffective assistance of coun-
sel); People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (defendant was prejudiced at trial
by defense counsel's failure to present evidence of battering); People v. Roilock, 577 N.Y.S.2d. 90
(App. Div. 1991) (defense lawyer claimed that he didn't know that defendant was a battered
woman, so his failure to introduce expert testimony on battering did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel); State v. Donner, 645 N.E.2d 165 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (defense attorney
told battered woman defendant she "had no defense.").
97. See, e.g., State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 971 (Ohio 1990) (battered woman defendant
testified that she did not remember anything from the time her husband hit her to the time she
heard what she believed was him "gurgling" blood after she shot him); State v. Felton, 329
N.W.2d 161, 164-5 (Wis. 1983) (battered woman defendant did not remember firing the shot that
Idlled her batterer); see also WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CAsEs, supra note 2 at 53; Kim L. Schep-
pele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of
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who kills may have difficulty in obtaining adequate information neces-
sary to develop an effective defense from the defendant alone. As a
result, an attorney may perceive the woman as "difficult" or may ask
questions in a way that causes the woman to mistrust him or her be-
cause he or she seems not to believe or understand the woman's bat-
tering experience, or to blame her for it.98 In some cases, defense law-
yers avoid the issue of domestic violence completely by failing to offer
evidence of battering, 9 indicating their lack of knowledge or discom-
fort with this threatening subject.
Thoughtful determination of choice of defense for battered women
defendants requires lawyers to understand the framework of inequality
that shapes these cases. Because the law has developed with a male
norm in mind, and because stereotypes about women, and about bat-
tered women in particular, persist in the minds of judges, juries, and
lawyers themselves, lawyers need to be self-critical about their own as-
sumptions, seek assistance from experts in the field, and recognize and
point out gender bias in the law where it occurs. 100 They must use the
Truth, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 123, 126-8 (1992). Memory loss, or inability to adequately express
the experience of having been battered, can be one result of trauma women experience in a bat-
tering relationship -one of the many survival tactics with which women may respond to abuse.
This phenomenon, like other aspects of battering, has been characterized recently by an expert in
the field as arising "as much from the deprivation of liberty implied by coercion and control as it
does from violence-induced trauma." Stark, supra note 37, at 986.
98. Lawyers and others to whom battered women may attempt to relate the events as they
recall them may not want to hear a woman describe the kind of aggressive behavior that would be
taken for granted as "self-defense" were it related by a man. See supra notes 19-26 and accompa-
nying text.
99. See People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Miller,
634 A.2d 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State v. Donner, 645 N.E.2d 165 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
100. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Gender bias is an issue in a variety of legal
contexts for battered women. While this article focuses on the self-defense context, there are a
large number of cases in which battered women choose a defense of duress, and have similar
problems to those encountered when they claim self-defense. See Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308
(10th Cir. 1992) ("battered woman syndrome" evidence admissible to rebut inference of intent
where defendant was charged with aiding and abetting her batterer); United States v. Johnson,
956 F.2d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1992) supplemented on denial of reh'g sub nom. United States v.
Emelio, 969 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1992) (evidence of battering relative to downward departure at
sentencing, but not to a "complete" duress defense).
Sentencing is another area where gender bias may come into play. Although in some contexts
women may receive more lenient treatment than men in criminal sentencing proceedings, see Ilene
H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: Equal
Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 182 (1994); Victor Streib, Death
Penalty for Female Offenders, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 878 (1990), women who behave violently
toward men are viewed with particular horror and outrage, see WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES,
supra note 2, at 7, or, conversely, with greater "private" forms of control; Denno, supra note 21,
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resources available to them to educate judges and juries about myths
and misconceptions about battering that may impede fair trials.101
The determination of reasonableness is also where we see the
greatest resistance on the part of judges in these cases. As I have dis-
cussed elsewhere, resistance to reasonableness can be seen in a variety
of different contexts where feminist lawyering has sought to expand the
contours of understanding about the meaning of legal harms. °2 For
example, in the sexual harassment context, the struggle over the legal
standard by which sexual harassment is judged is crucial, whether the
standard is reasonableness generally or "reasonable woman." But in
cases of battered women who have killed, the resistance is profound. It
is simply impossible for many lawyers, judges, legal scholars, and the
at 161, 164 (noting that families and communities are more likely to see females in need of
intervention and control); BARBARA M. BRENzEL, From Punishment to Moral Therapy, in
DAUGHTERS OF THE STATE: A SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF THE FIRST REFORM SCHOOL FOR GIRLS IN
NORTH AMERICA, 1856-1905 (1983) (discussing the historical reconceptualization of women's
crime as "waywardness," requiring "treatment" or "education" in less "masculine" environments
than prisons, such as reform schools, asylums, religious and other institutions). For a discussion of
gender under the new federal sentencing guidelines, see Raeder, supra note 50. At least one
scholar has documented the role that gender-bias plays in mental competency proceedings. See
Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory and Law, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 763 (1993).
101. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Adequate representation requires insight
into common misunderstandings about battering and about battered women, about gender and
other inequalities in the criminal law as applied to these women, and of the pitfalls into which
many lawyers-experienced and inexperienced-and judges have fallen. Adequate representation
also requires a clear legal understanding of the available defenses under the applicable statutes
and case law in each particular jurisdiction. Defense counsel must thoroughly search cases in the
particular jurisdiction involving battered women, not only to see how the law is applied in these
cases and what particular legal dilemmas arise, but also for indications of courts' and legislators'
conceptual misunderstandings or biases about battered women that may require education. For
example, a search should include not only criminal cases or homicide or other cases involving
battered women as defendants, but family law cases, an investigation of protective order policies
and how well those are carried out, legislation specifically aimed at addressing battering and the
underlying policies such legislation may indicate, and so on. Even in a jurisdiction that appears to
have some sensitivity to battering as a social problem, this understanding may be limited to cer-
tain members of the judiciary, or only to legislators or a particular executive officer. Moreover,
such sensitivity may only be extended to the "good" battered woman. Women of color, women
who have expressed rage or asserted themselves in other ways, women who have been unable to
protect children from the batterer or who have committed child abuse themselves, may not fall
into the category of the "good" battered woman who may receive the benefit of increased sensitiv-
ity to the problem of battering. See, e.g., DONILBEN LosEaE, THE BATTERED WOMAN AND SHEL-
TERS 171 (1992) (describing the definition of "the battered woman" by shelter workers as the
"appropriate client."); SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 128 ("women who attempt to assert their
humanity and equality by negotiating with their husbands or demanding what they need are la-
beled provocative.").
102. Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 2.
1996]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
public at large to imagine that women are acting reasonably when they
kill their intimate partners. These cases evoke more profound discom-
fort than cases when the reverse is true-like the O.J. Simpson case,
for example. 103
One of the most significant procedural manifestations of this dis-
comfort can be seen on the question of whether reasonableness for pur-
poses of self-defense must be "objective" or "subjective." While there
has been much debate within the criminal law literature on this issue,
it is clear that the standard of self-defense in most jurisdictions has
both a "subjective" and "objective" component to it and that "subjec-
tive" and "objective" must be understood as interrelated.10' But some
legal scholars,105 and many judges 0 6 have manifested their discomfort
103. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, What Happened to Public Education About Domestic
Violence, in POST-MORTEM: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996).
104. See Maguigan, supra note 2, at 391; Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note
2, at 218.
105. For example, George Fletcher argues that only an objective standard should govern the
determination of self-defense, and that there is a clear difference between the woman's "reasona-
ble belief" and "interaction in the real world." Fletcher, supra note 18, at 553.
106. Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), is an example of the
complex impact gendered assumptions about reasonableness continue to have on the cases of bat-
tered women who kill. Ardella Miller appealed her conviction in a bench trial for third-degree
murder for the stabbing death of her common-law husband. During the incident in question, Mr.
Smith had been threatening and beating Ms. Miller. When he asked her whether she wanted to
"join" her dead brother, a knife fell from his pocket, and they both reached for it. Ms. Miller
stabbed Mr. Smith with the knife and he died. 634 A.2d at 616. At trial, Ms. Miller's defense was
self-defense. In her appeal, she asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on her
trial attorney's failure to present evidence, including evidence of battering, that would have sup-
ported her self-defense claim. Because "the use of a deadly instrument on a vital part of the body
is sufficient to establish the specific intent to kill," the Miller court determined that the ineffec-
tiveness claim had no merit. 634 A.2d at 617.
One reading of this case is that the Superior Court determined that the trial court had prop-
erly held Ms. Miller to a "like force" proportionality requirement in its application of the law of
self-defense. The Superior Court's description of the issue Ms. Miller was raising suggests that the
court may have labored under the same misconceptions or biases as the jury at trial: "Does the
Commonwealth disprove self defense by speculating that the victim was unarmed, and by arguing
that his previous violence had not caused serious bodily injury and that the defendant has re-
mained in the abusive relationship?" 634 A.2d at 616. The assumptions implicit in this formula-
tion of the issue are that (i) women and men are always equals in physically aggressive situations
and fight in a substantially similar manner, such that using a weapon on an unarmed attacker is
"unsportsmanlike" (the proportionality problem); (ii) that "bodily injury" is the end-all and be-all
of battering in the intimate relationship (which negates battered women's commonly heightened
sensibilities regarding their batterers' potential for violence, and thereby narrows the imminence
requirement's applicability to battered women), and (iii) that women are somehow more culpable
for whatever consequences may arise for themselves, their children, and the batterer when they




with the notion that battered women can claim that their actions are
"objectively" reasonable. In several cases, despite the holding in State
v. Kelly,"'7 judges have prevented battered women from going to the
jury with self-defense claims on the theory that they only meet the
"subjective" and not the "objective" prong of the self-defense stan-
dard.10 8 As I have argued, evidence of battering is relevant under both
an "objective" and a "subjective" standard of self-defense. Regardless
of which standard a jurisdiction enunciates, "it has been recognized
that these characterizations of subjective and objective are poles on a
continuum, since the jury must find that the actor acted reasonably
under either approach."109
C. "Battered Woman Syndrome"
The common and undifferentiated use of the term "battered wo-
man syndrome" has heightened general confusion about domestic vio-
lence and battered women and the likelihood of misapplication of the
law to these women.11  Battering relationships share characteristics
which arise from the common cultural and historical roots of male vio-
lence against women, as well as from the subordination of women both
in intimate relationships and in the world. However, the experiences of
battered women are highly diverse and complex, and battered women
107. 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984) (expert testimony on battering relevant under an "objec-
tive" standard of self-defense); see also Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 2, at
208-210 (discussing the implications of standards of objectivity and subjectivity reflected in the
court's analysis in Kelly).
108. People v. Humphrey, No. S045985 (Cal. 1996) (appealing voluntary manslaughter
conviction of battered woman who killed her batterer on grounds that jury instruction precluding
consideration of expert testimony on battering in determining objective reasonableness of defend-
ant's belief she was in imminent danger); People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
("battered woman syndrome" expert testimony irrelevant to objective reasonableness of defend-
ant's belief she was in imminent danger); People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
("battered woman syndrome" irrelevant to objectively reasonable belief defendant was in immi-
nent danger); State v. Guess, No. A-2837-94T2 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1996) (appealing reckless man-
slaughter conviction of battered woman who killed her batterer on the grounds that the trial court
erred in charging the jury that expert testimony on battering was relevant to the subjective, but
not the objective prong of reasonable belief in imminent danger); see also Scott Graham, Justices
Weigh Battered Woman's Self-Defense Claim; Court Sounds Troubled by Limit on Expert Testi-
mony, AM. LAw., June 7, 1996, at 1 (reporting on oral argument in the California Supreme Court
in the Humphrey case).
109. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 2.
110. See, e.g., Renee Callahan, Will the "Real" Battered Woman Please Stand Up? In
Search of a Realistic Legal Definition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER & L.
117 (1994); Dutton, supra note 2 at 1193; Sheehy, Stubbs & Tolmie, Defending Battered Women
on Trial: Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitations, 16 CRIM. L.J. 369 (1992).
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defendants do not all fit into the same legal mold."1 ' The term "bat-
tered woman syndrome" also tends to shift the focus of-and the blame
for-intimate violence to the woman away from the perpetrator. Its
widespread use, even in common parlance, has tended to reinforce
traditional attitudes about women's responsibility for their own abuse.
There are many descriptions of the battering relationship and bat-
tered women's experiences which emphasize a wide range of dynamics
and behavior. 112 "Battered woman syndrome," a term originally coined
by psychologist Lenore Walker,113 is one particular description of bat-
tered women's experiences, one which carries a connotation of psycho-
logical impairment of the woman. However, because the term is fre-
111. For a discussion of the diverse experiences of battered women, see RlCsssE, supra note
54 (describing the experiences of battered African American women incarcerated in New York
City and the double-bind in which they find themselves due to societal gender roles, racism, and
abuse by their partners); NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BATTERING
(Kerry Lobel ed., 1986); Sharon A. Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black
Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1991) (calling for expert testimony on bat-
tering that takes into account women's different cultural experiences); Ammons, Mules, Madon-
nas, supra note 2; Crenshaw, supra note 54, at 1244; Dutton, supra note 2 at 1194; Beverly
Horsburgh, Domestic Violence in the Jewish Community, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 171 (1995);
Mahoney, supra note 2; Rimonte, supra note 54; Rivera, supra note 54.
112. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 37, at 975. Stark argues that "battered woman's syn-
drome" and "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,"
the "traumatization model," provide an inaccurate, reductionist, and potentially demeaning
representation of woman battering, and particularly of its two most perplexing facets: that
the situation is typically ongoing and that it can elicit hostage-like levels of fear, isolation,
entrapment, and retaliatory violence. Drawn from our experience of what is most salient
for battered women, the alternative framework ... emphasizes the batterer's pattern of
coercion and control rather than his violent acts of their effect on victim psychology. The
coercive control framework shifts the basis of women's justice claims from stigmatizing
psychological assessments of traumatization to the links between structural inequality, the
systemic nature of women's oppression in a particular relationship, and the harms associ-
ated with domination and resistance as it has been lived.
See also Allard, supra note 111 (calling for expert testimony on battering that takes into
account women's different cultural experiences); Dutton, supra note 2 (noting that battered
women have diverse experiences and responses to battering and cannot be limited to a single
psychological profile); Mahoney, supra note 2 at 9-10 (noting that battering is "a struggle for
power and control and show[ing] how legal analysis can help reveal the control issue by naming
separation assault and building litigation strategies to redefine the issue of separation."); Schnei-
der, Describing and Changing supra note 2, at 216 (noting that "[t]he notion of battered woman
syndrome contains the seeds of old stereotypes of women in new form. . . [and] this perspective
is potentially counterproductive in that it explains why the woman did not leave but not why she
acted. . . . It also does not describe the complex experiences of battered women.... [and] has
the potential to exclude battered women whose circumstances depart from the model and force
them once again into pleas of insanity or manslaughter rather than expanding our understandings
of reasonableness.").
113. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME, at 1 (1994).
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quently used as shorthand for "evidence of a battering relationship" by
judges, legislators, and legal scholars, it is not clear in any particular
context what is actually meant by use of the term "battered woman
syndrome." "Battered woman syndrome" was originally a clinical
description of certain psychological effects produced by the trauma of
battering, most notably "learned helplessness" resulting from the cycli-
cal nature of woman abuse,114 but it has been used in courtrooms to
describe a range of issues. Expert testimony on "battered woman syn-
drome" may be used to describe a woman's prior responses to violence,
and the context in which those responses occurred 115 or to describe the
dynamics of the abusive relationship. 6 Other experts have claimed
"battered woman syndrome" as a subcategory of posttraumatic stress
disorder . 17 "Battered woman syndrome" may also include a descrip-
tion of woman abuse as a larger social problem." 8
114. See generally WALKER, supra note 113; see also WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE 35-37
(1989). Walker's pioneering work pointed out the typical cycle of violence in the violent relation-
ship, consisting of a tension-building period, a violent episode, and a "honeymoon" period. The
cycle of violence, according to Walker, tends to give an appearance of randomness to the abuse,
contributing to the development of "learned helplessness" in some women. Quoting her own testi-
mony as an expert, Walker describes "learned helplessness" as a theory that
explains how people lose the ability to predict whether their natural responses will protect
them after they experience inescapable pain in what appear to be random and variable
situations.
The process of learned helplessness results in a state with deficits in three specific
areas: in the area where battered women think, in how they feel, and in the way they
behave. People who suffer from learned helplessness restrict the number of responses that
they make to those with the highest probability of success. When a battered woman per-
ceives she is in danger, if she has developed learned helplessness, she is likely to respond
using the most predictable method of protecting herself. Sometimes that means using
deadly force.
Indeed, even the "symptoms" that have been "clustered under the heading of 'battered wo-
man's syndrome" are themselves diverse, and do not all occur in any one woman: "major depres-
sive, sexual, and dissociative disorders; cognitive changes in how one views oneself and under-
stands the world . . .the 'Stockholm syndrome' or 'traumatic bonding'...."
115. Id. at 1196.
116. Id. at note 14 ("it is not uncommon to see the term 'battered woman syndrome' used
to refer to both [psychological effects of abuse and dynamics of abusive relationships].").
117. See WALKER, supra note 114, at 48; Dutton, supra note 2, at 1198; Stark, supra note
37, at 974.
118. See Dutton, supra note 2, at 1195. Dutton notes that:
Typically, the testimony offered in forensic cases is not limited to the psychological reac-
tions or sequelae of domestic violence victims, and this has led to confusion about what is
encompassed by the term "battered woman syndrome." Expert witness testimony may also
be offered to explain the nature of domestic violence in general, to explain what may ap-
pear to be puzzling behavior on the part of the victim, or to explain a background or
behavior that may be interpreted to suggest that the victim is not the "typical" battered
woman or that she herself is the abuser.
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The use of expert testimony on "battered woman syndrome" high-
lights this confusion. It can be admitted in court to demonstrate the
reasonableness of women's acts in support of claims of self-defense119
and to demonstrate their "irrationality" in support of insanity de-
fenses.120 It has been used by courts for many different purposes, to
explain why a woman stayed in an abusive relationship,121 to rebut
common myths and misconceptions about battered women, 22 to de-
scribe battered women's responses to violence in a general way,1 25 and
to explain why a specific battered woman responded in the way that
she did. 24 However, the term and its interpretive framework have been
widely criticized. 25 Significantly, other interpretive frameworks to de-
scribe battering that have been proposed, such as "coercive control,"' 26
do not focus exclusively on the woman who has been battered, but on
the batterer or the relationship.
Many lawyers who represent battered women know little about
battering and are not knowledgeable about the range of different psy-
chological and psychosocial theories of battering. They use the term
"battered woman syndrome" and rely on a "battered woman syn-
drome" framework because it is what they have heard. Frequently they
use the term as shorthand when what they really mean is "evidence of
battering." But reliance on "battered woman syndrome" as an explana-
tory framework in case analysis is problematic. It may not only be in-
accurate in describing the experiences of many women who are bat-
tered, but will inevitably shape and limit lawyers' views of available
choice of defenses.' Because "battered woman syndrome" sounds like
Id. Dutton argues that "descriptive references should be made to 'expert testimony concerning
battered women's experiences,' " instead of the term "battered woman syndrome." Id. at 1201.
119. See, e.g., O-no REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Anderson 1993) (expert testimony on
"battered woman syndrome" admissible in self-defense).
120. See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39.2 (Anderson 1993) (making expert testi-
mony on "battered woman syndrome" admissible in insanity defenses), see also Anderson v.
Goeke, 44 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 1995).
121. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375-377 (N.J. 1984).
122. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dillon, 598 A.2d 963, 969 (Pa. 1991).
123. See, e.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
124. See, e.g., People v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217-218 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
125. See Dutton, supra note 2, at 1193; Stark, supra note 37, at 1000. Stark notes that:
"At best, [battered woman syndrome and post traumatic stress disorder] remain psychiatric desig-
nations which possess the attendant risks of misuse and stigma and which diminish, but do not
eliminate, the burden of insanity attached to battered women in the past." Id; see also supra notes
82, 84, 86 and 87 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 2. Lawyers need to educate them-
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a form of "mental disease or defect," lawyers relying on this frame-
work are more likely to view the case through an impaired mental state
lens.
D. "Battered Woman" or "Battered Woman Syndrome" Defense
Some lawyers,1 28 legislators129 judges 50and legal scholars31 have
selves on the range of experiences of battered women and on the dynamics of abuse so that they
can better hear and understand their clients' stories and educate judges and jurors on the context
of abuse.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Shepard, No. 95-2433, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 35931 (8th
Cir. Dec. 20, 1995) (defense attorney found not ineffective for not relying on a "battered-woman
syndrome" expert or "battered woman syndrome" defense); Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322 (6th
Cir. 1984) (defense attorney decided to pursue claim of self- defense rather than a "battered wife
defense" which he thought was more applicable to "non-confrontation cases); State v. Scott, 1989
WL 90613 (Del. Super. July 19, 1989) (defense attorney referred to client's defense as "battered
woman's defense."); Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261 n.4 (Nev. 1988) (defense attorney told expert
he had hired to testify at trial of a woman for the shooting death of her abusive husband, "If we
won this case, we'd be flying across the country consulting . . . in special cases like this and I'd
have all the work I could handle."); see also Maguigan, supra note 2, at 426-27 n. 169.
129. See Osthoff, supra note 30 (Fact sheet written in response to proposed state legislation,
available from the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women). The issue of
"special" legislation regarding the admissibility of evidence of battering in criminal cases is dis-
cussed in greater detail in part IV, infra.
130. See, e.g., Moran v. Ohio, 105 S. Ct. 350, 351 (1984). (Brennan, J., dissenting) (In
their dissent from a denial of certiorari of an appeal of a battered woman's homicide case, Justices
Brennan and Marshall claim that "battered woman's syndrome [is] a self-defense theory that has
gained increasing support in recent years."); State v. Vigil, 794 P.2d 728, 729 (N.M. 1990) (re-
ferring to a "battered woman theory of self-defense"); Commonwealth v. Tyson, 526 A.2d 395
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (referring to the "defense of 'battered woman's syndrome' ".).
Some jurisdictions recognize "battered woman syndrome" as a separate tortious harm. In
Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994) a recent tort case, plaintiff brought a
cause of action against her former live-in lover for "allegedly causing her to suffer from battered
woman's syndrome." The court noted that the New Jersey legislature recognized domestic vio-
lence as a crime, that the legislature had recognized the seriousness of the problem of domestic
violence when it passed the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, and that New Jersey recognized
"battered-woman's syndrome" as an element of self-defense and permitted expert testimony on
battering in such cases. Consequently, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action. In doing so, the court held that domestic violence is a continuing tort, so
that the statute of limitations was not tolled for each individual assault, which would have pre-
cluded the plaintiff from pursuing a cause of action. However, by naming the tort "battered-
woman's syndrome," the focus is once again placed on some ambiguous pathology, either preexist-
ing or caused by the violence, with its locus in the woman, which kept her from "just leaving":
As is the case with the domestic violence statute where existing criminal statutes were
inadequate, so too are the civil laws of assault and battery insufficient to redress the harms
suffered as a result of domestic violence. Domestic violence is a plague on our social struc-
ture and a frontal assault on the institution of the family. The battered woman's syndrome
is but one of the pernicious symptoms of that plague. Though the courts would be hard-
pressed to prescribe a panacea for all domestic violence, they are entrusted with the power
to fashion a palliative when necessary. . . .Thus, this court will recognize the battered-
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suggested that there is or should be a special battered woman or "bat-
tered woman syndrome" defense. Not only is there no separate defense,
but evidence of battering experiences and a history of battering,
whether explained as "battered woman syndrome" or battering gener-
ally, may be relevant to a range of defenses. Problems of gender-bias
shape the application of all defenses and excuses, and the history of
battering may be relevant to all, in different ways.
Judicial opinions in a number of recent battered woman self-de-
fense cases correctly remind us that there is no separate "battered wo-
man syndrome" defense."3 2 In Pennsylvania, for example, courts have
expressed different views on the admissibility of evidence of battering
in both self-defense and duress cases.' 33 This is due in part to differing
woman's syndrome as an affirmative cause of action under the laws of New Jersey, 652
A.2d at 793. For a discussion of Cusseaux, see Chamallas, supra note 43, at 816-17.
131. See Coughlin, supra note 2 ("battered woman syndrome defense"); Claire 0. Finkel-
stein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 U. PrrT. L. REv. 621, 631 (1996) ("excuse of bat-
tered woman syndrome"); Mira Mihajlovich, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman
Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253, 1280 (1987) ("bat-
tered woman syndrome defense" should be diminished capacity); Elizabeth Vaughan & Maureen
L. Moore, The Battered Spouse Defense in Kentucky, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 399 (1983) ("battered
woman defense" is emerging "as akin to, but separate from, the more familiar and established
defenses of self-defense and diminished capacity").
Anne Coughlin has recently argued that there is a battered woman syndrome defense, and
that it "institutionalizes within the criminal law negative stereotypes of women." Coughlin, supra
note 2, at 4-5. In support of this proposition she cites my article, Describing and Changing:
Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering. However, my
article focused on expert testimony on battering, and did not advocate or claim that there was any
separate "battered woman syndrome defense," or that one has ever been promoted by feminist
lawyers. Rather, as Professor Coughlin correctly observes, I critique the syndrome as the exclusive
characterization of battered women's experiences, because of its tendency to pathologize all bat-
tered women. It is precisely because the use of clinical language, such as "battered woman syn-
drome," to describe battered women's experiences makes it sound as if the defense being offered
in every case of a battered woman who kills her abuser is a "special" or separate defense for
battered women that it is problematic. In contrast, Professor Coughlin asserts that "[t]he defense
itself defines the woman as a collection of mental symptoms, motivational deficits, and behavioral
abnormalities; indeed, the fundamental premise of the defense is that women lack the psychologi-
cal capacity to choose lawful means to extricate themselves from abusive mates." Coughlin, supra
note 2, at 7 (emphasis added).
132. See, e.g., State v. Coleman, 870 P.2d 695, 697 (Kan. 1994) ("Evidence of battered
woman syndrome is not a defense to a murder charge."); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974
(Ohio, 1990) (admission of expert testimony on battering does not establish a new defense or
justification); Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614, 619 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (stating that
"this syndrome has not been adopted as a separate defense in Pennsylvania."); see also WOMEN'S
SELF-DEFENSE CASES, supra note 2, at 43; Maguigan, supra note 2.
133. Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614 (Pa. Super Ct. 1993) (rejecting a "battered
woman syndrome theory of self-defense"); Commonwealth v. Ely, 578 A.2d 540, 541 (Pa. Super
Ct. 1990) (discussing implications of "battered woman syndrome theory of self-defense" for
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views among judges about whether and how "battered woman syn-
drome" evidence is relevant to defenses of self-defense or duress and a
fear on the part of some judges that admission of this evidence indi-
cates an entirely separate defense available only to battered women.2"
Evidence of battering 5 is crucial in dispelling myths and misconcep-
tions commonly held by jurors about battered women, and helping ju-
rors to understand the experiences of battered women as they are rele-
vant to women's understanding of the level of danger they are in and
their reactions to the perceived danger.13 6 In other words, evidence of
battering in a self-defense case is not relevant insofar as it attempts to
justify killing in and of itself. It is relevant because it helps the jury to
understand the woman's particular experiences with her batterer. It
gives the jury insight about the development of her heightened ability
to sense that she was in grave danger at the time of the killing. It
provides the jury with the appropriate context in which to decide
whether her apprehension of imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm was reasonable.
Although some trial and appellate courts articulate the relevance
of evidence of battering correctly, many judges are confused. 87 Some
duress).
134. Graham, supra note 108, at 1 (quoting a justice on the California Supreme Court who
heard oral argument in the Humphrey case as saying, "Should we be concerned that if we agree
with the defense, that we will be giving rise to the 'reasonable gang member's syndrome?' ");
Miller, 634 A.2d at 619 (stating that "this syndrome has not been adopted as a separate defense
in Pennsylvania," and implying that it has been elsewhere); Commonwealth v. Ely, 578 A.2d at
541 (discussing implications of "the battered woman's syndrome theory of self-defense" for du-
ress; Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 135 (Wyo. 1995) (using phrase "Battered Woman syndrome
defense").
135. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984); WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASEs,
supra note 2; Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 5.
136. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 368 (N.J. 1984) (expert testimony on battering
admissible in the case of a battered woman who killed her batterer because "[i]t is aimed at an
area where the purported common knowledge of the jury may be very much mistaken"); see also
EWING, supra note 2 (finding that battered women tried for killing their batterers were more
likely to receive an acquittal where an expert testified on battering); Schuller, supra note 80 (find-
ing that jurors were more likely to acquit battered woman defendants where expert testimony
linked the defendant to the "battered woman syndrome," and that the more jurors endorsed myths
and misconceptions about battered women, the less likely they were to render a not guilty verdict,
and that males were more likely to endorse such concepts than females, cited in Vidmar & Schul-
ler, supra note 80, at 142); Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 80 (reviewing current literature on
juror attitudes about battering).
137. In Anderson v. Goeke, 44 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 1995), the Eighth Circuit denied post-
conviction relief to a battered woman, where the trial judge had allowed reference to the syn-
drome during voir dire and trial "only as evidence of diminished mental capacity" despite the fact
that the Missouri statute on "Battered Spouse Law" provided that "evidence that the actor was
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courts employ a "hybrid" defense.13 8 Other courts express confusion
about defense strategy or "specialized" application of traditional self-
defense law to battered women, indicating that, in practice, there may
well be a "battered woman syndrome defense." 139 There should not be.
Neither a "special" defense nor "special" rules for battered women are
consistent with an "equal rights" framework, or likely to remedy gen-
der-bias.
E. The Impact of "Special" Legislation
Since this work has brought public attention to cases involving
battered women who kill, state legislation has been proposed and en-
acted which seeks to remedy perceived inequities in treatment of bat-
tered women at trial by addressing the "special" problems of battered
women. Statutes which focus exclusively on battered women,1 0 largely
around admissibility of expert testimony, are problematic for several
reasons. First, they tend to single out problems of battered women as
though they are "special" and should not be understood within the gen-
eral framework of the criminal law. For example, a statute which
makes evidence of "battered woman syndrome" admissible suggests
that this evidence would not otherwise be admissible. Second, it is de-
batable whether legislative reforms are the best solution to the problem
of unequal treatment of battered woman defendants. Third, the statu-
tory language may be too limiting and will restrict its utility.
Two examples are a Maryland statute which permits evidence of
abuse of the defendant and expert testimony on "battered spouse syn-
drome, '  and two Ohio statutes which authorize expert testimony on
suffering from the battered spouse syndrome shall be admissible upon the issue of whether the
actor lawfully acted in self-defense or defense of another," Mo. REv. STAT. § 563.033(1) (West
Supp. 1996), 44 F.3d at 680 (emphasis added).
138. See, e.g., Banks v. State, 608 A.2d 1249, 1252 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (defense at
trial was "an amalgam of self-defense, hot-blooded response to provocation, and battered spouse
syndrome").
139. Id.; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text. Battered women's advocates have
not asked for or claimed any "special" or separate defense for battered women defendants. Legis-
lation and application of what may appear to be a separate defense are the result of well-inten-
tioned but misguided attempts by legislators, judges, and attorneys to grapple with the problem of
women's unequal access to justice.
140. See sources cited supra note 30.
141. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (1991 Supp.). The use of the term
"battered spouse syndrome" is even more problematic because it is questionable whether there is
such a phenomenon. The statute appears to recognize this as it defines "battered spouse syn-
drome" as the "psychological condition of the victim [of battering] recognized in the medical and
scientific community as the battered woman syndrome."
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"battered-woman syndrome" in self-defense142 and insanity defenses.1 43
The Ohio statutes permit the introduction of expert testimony only to
support either the imminence element of a self-defense claim or "to
establish the requisite impairment of the Defendant's reason necessary
for a finding that the Defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity.
1 44
Both the Ohio statutes and the Maryland statute assume that this evi-
dence would not be otherwise admissible. This assumption can create
the impression that a separate defense for battered women has been
codified.1
45
There are serious questions about the need for special legislation
concerning battering in these cases. Depending on the particular state,
it may be the legal standard of self-defense or the law governing the
admissibility of evidence of battering which are problematic and need
reform, or it may be simply that judges apply these laws in a gender-
biased fashion. 46 In many states, special legislation was developed as a
"quick fix" effort to appear to do something about domestic violence
and was not grounded on careful analysis of the particular state's statu-
tory scheme and case law in the criminal law area on procedural issues
such as burden of proof on self-defense.1 47 However, if special legisla-
tion to admit expert testimony is developed, it is important that the
statutory language be as inclusive as possible to admit evidence of bat-
142. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Anderson Supp. 1993).
143. OHno REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.39.2 (Anderson Supp. 1993).
144. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.39.2 (Anderson Supp. 1993).
145. This is not to say that the statutes discussed herein intend to do this. Indeed, the
Maryland statute specifically states that the statute "does not create a new defense to murder."
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916 at 2. However, the presence of a separate statute
with regard to some cases cannot help but create the impression that a separate defense or other
"special" treatment has been created for those cases alone. The presence of language to the con-
trary within the statute, like that quoted above, seems to speak to those who are fearful that
justice may be thrown to the wind to "make up for" past discrimination. See Fletcher, supra note
18 at 576. In fact, these statutes attempt to deal with the acknowledged present unequal treat-
ment that battered women face in the justice system. Recognition of unequal treatment by
thoughtful legislators is welcome, and efforts to remedy that treatment may be well-intentioned.
However, I am concerned with the impact these statutes may have on particular women's cases.
146. See, e.g., Maguigan, supra note 2; Osthoff, supra note 30 (fact sheet written in re-
sponse to proposed state legislation, available from the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of
Battered Women (on file with the author)).
147. Maguigan, supra note 2 at 451-55. Professor Maguigan carefully separates out the
procedural strands of substantive self-defense standards (identified as reasonableness, imminence,
proportionality of force, and duty to retreat) from evidentiary rules (history of abuse and expert
testimony). She discusses the ways in which these aspects of the problem are interrelated and
emphasizes that they must be analyzed together in assessing how a state's criminal law and proce-
dural rules impact on battered women charged with homicide.
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tering generally. One example is a Texas statute, which states that in
all prosecutions for murder, the defendant shall be permitted to offer
"relevant evidence that the defendant had been the victim of acts of
family violence committed by the deceased and relevant expert testi-
mony regarding the condition of [her] mind ... [including] relevant
facts and circumstances relating to family violence that are the basis of
experts' opinions. ' 48 Similarly, in Louisiana, the relevant statute does
not refer at all to "battered woman syndrome," but provides simply,
"an expert's opinion as to the effects of the prior assaultive acts on the
accused's state of mind is admissible. '149 A recent Massachusetts stat-
ute provides for admissibility of evidence "that the defendant is or has
been the victim of acts of physical, sexual or psychological harm or
abuse" in a wide range of circumstances, including self-defense, de-
fense of another, duress or coercion, or "accidental harm."150
IV. IMPACTS OF RESISTANCE TO EQUALITY
Misconceptions about battered women who kill have led to consid-
erable confusion in judicial opinions, legal scholarship and in more
"public" sources of information, such as the media.15 1 Issues of admis-
sibility of evidence and expert testimony on battering are confused with
"special" defenses for battered women; the term "battered woman syn-
drome" becomes the shorthand for both. Not surprisingly, it appears
that battered women homicide cases have a substantially higher appel-
late reversal rate than other comparable cases.1 52 Here, I focus on two
areas which highlight these problems: ineffective assistance of counsel
claims which have been litigated and the host of clemency
cases-which may involve potential ineffective assistance of counsel
claims as well as other trial errors-that have surfaced around the
country.15 3
148. TEx. CRiaM. PRO. CODE ANN. § 38.36 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
149. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 404 (A)(2)(a) (West 1995).
150. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 23E (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
151. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Precise statistics and even anecdotal data
regarding clemency petitions are difficult to document. Clemency proceeding transcripts are rarely
published. Organizations which assist battered women with their clemency petitions are a patch-
work of attorney-led organizations, battered women's lay advocacy groups, and other community
organizations that do not always network with one another or share data on a regular basis. How-
ever, in a recent telephone conversation, Holly White of the National Clearinghouse for the De-
fense of Battered Women, Philadelphia, reported that the number of clemency petitions filed by
battered women does not appear to have significantly decreased, while the number of cases in
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There have been many ineffective assistance of counsel claims
brought by battered women defendants. 154 These cases are notoriously
difficult to win. 155 The standard for ineffectiveness set by the Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington15 is egregious error resulting in
prejudice to the defendant. The defendant has the burden of proof to
show such error at trial, and anything that may be characterized as a
tactical decision by the trial attorney is nonreviewable.
There are many ineffective assistance of counsel claims that have
been brought by battered women who have been convicted at trial. 57
However, ineffective assistance of counsel cases brought by battered
women tend to fall into the category of claimed attorney error which
courts rarely review, particularly attorney failure to interview possible
defense witnesses or otherwise investigate sources of information which
could possibly be helpful to the defense.158 Among cases involving bat-
which clemency is granted to battered women seems to have "tapered off." Telephone conversa-
tion with Holly White, National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, Philadelphia,
Pa. (November 20, 1995).
154. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
155. Courts are strict about what kinds of claimed attorney error they will review. When
they do, the standard of review is so high, few defendants can prove ineffective assistance. Even a
breach of an ethical standard "does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of assistance of counsel." Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986).
156. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
157. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
158. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987). Other areas where attorney incompetence
is difficult to challenge because they require "hindsight," are (1) claims based largely on the
attorney's decision to pursue a particular line of defense over other possibilities, where the attor-
ney appears to have investigated other defenses; (2) failure to call a witness who offers to give
favorable testimony; (3) the attorney's decision to relinquish a certain defense right where he or
she had exercised various other rights; and (4) failure to advance additional supporting arguments
or rebut counterarguments to a legal objection the attorney has made and developed previously.
Indeed, the difficulty of meeting the burden of proof to show ineffective assistance of counsel
for defendants generally, and battered women particularly, is illustrated by the fact that, of
twenty-six reported cases from fourteen states and one federal jurisdiction in which ineffective
assistance of counsel claims had been raised by battered women as of 1994, see cases annotated at
18 A.L.R. 5th 871 (1994), twice as many of the claims were denied as were successful. Battered
women face particular difficulties related to their unique experiences and widespread ignorance
about the phenomenon of intimate violence in proving ineffective assistance of counsel. For exam-
ple, in Strickland the Supreme Court noted that claims based on attorney failure to investigate
must focus on the "information supplied [to counsel] by the defendant." Strickland, supra note
156, at 691.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by battered women defendants collected in 18
A.L.R. 5th are divided into seven categories: (1) failure to investigate adequately; (2) improper
legal advice (generally regarding plea bargaining or whether or not defendant should testify); (3)
choice and application of defenses (frequently a focus on or misunderstanding of the law of self-
defense that eclipses the attorney's exploration of provocation, heat of passion, or other available
defenses); (4) faulty opening statements (often promising evidence of battering that is not ade-
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tered women defendants where ineffective assistance of counsel claims
have been successful, the most common ground appears to be faulty
advice (either in the plea bargaining process or regarding whether the
defendant should testify). 159 Courts have also found ineffective assis-
tance based on the attorney's failure to adduce evidence or examine
witnesses at trial.160 Generally, the attorney's failure in either of these
areas has resulted in no evidence of battering offered at trial from
quately delivered); (5) failure to adduce evidence or examine witnesses at trial (almost always
including a failure to present expert testimony on battering, and often a failure to present medical
records, witnesses, and the defendant's own testimony that could have demonstrated the existence
of domestic violence and its impact on the defendant); (6) failure to request jury instructions
about battering (particularly in terms of how it is relevant to the law of self-defense); and (7)
other acts or omissions (including failure to obtain exculpatory reports regarding battering, failure
to object to prosecution's closing remarks, and advancing the interests of counsel over the client's
interests in making tactical decisions). All but the last two categories of attorney ineffectiveness
complained of by battered women are in areas where courts are loathe to find incompetence be-
cause investigation into and analysis of these actions or omissions by attorneys requires the "hind-
sight" discouraged in Strickland.
159. See State v. Scott, 1989 WL 90613 (Del. Super. Ct. July 19, 1989); Larson v. State,
766 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1988); State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); State
v. Gfeller, 1987 WL 14328 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
160. See People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Zimmerman,
823 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); Martin v. State, 501 So. 2d 1313 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App.
1986); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989).
Cases where ineffective assistance of counsel has also been found also include complaints over
the attorney's failure to investigate evidence of battering, see People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992), the attorney's choice and use of available defenses; see State v. Felton, 329
N.W.2d 161 (Wis. 1983), the attorney's opening statements indicating a defense involving evi-
dence of battering which was not followed with any such evidence; see State v. Zimmerman, 823
S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991), and the attorney's self-interest interfering with the effec-
tiveness of his or her performance; see Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1988).
In cases where claims of ineffective assistance have been rejected, the most common area
complained of appears to be the attorney's failure to adduce evidence or examine witnesses re-
garding battering at trial. See People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); Martin v. State, 501 So. 2d 1313 (Fl.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v.
Miller, 634 A.2d 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Other areas complained of include the attorney's
choice and use of available defenses, see, e.g., State v. Scott, 1989 WL 90613 (Del. Super. 1989);
Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1988); State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1991); State v. Gfeller, 1987 WL 14328 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Felton, 329
N.W.2d 161 (Wis. 1983), the attorney's failure to investigate adequately, see People v. Day, 2
Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), the attorney's failure to request jury instructions, see
Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Singh, 539 A.2d 1314
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Commonwealth v. Tyson, 526 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), and other
acts or omissions by the attorney; see State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1991) (attorney stated in opening remarks that he would produce evidence of battering, but never
presented any such evidence); Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1988) (attorney's self-interest
interfered with the effectiveness of his performance).
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sources such as medical reports, lay witnesses, family members, or the
defendant's own testimony, or no expert testimony on battering being
offered.
It is apparent that attorneys are susceptible to misconceptions
about battered women from the number of claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel based on faulty advice regarding plea bargains or the
defendant testifying,16' and on attorney failure to present evidence and
testimony that could have assisted the jury to understand and eradicate
the very same misconceptions apparently held by counsel. 162 Cases in-
volving claims of ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to of-
fer jury instructions on battering suggest that many attorneys lack
knowledge about the particular complexities of representing battered
women. 63 However, because many judges who rule on ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims also lack knowledge about domestic violence,
and are not sensitive to the complex issues of choice of defense and
admission of evidence, they may not be particularly thoughtful or rigor-
ous in evaluating these claims.'6
161. See State v. Scott, 1989 WL 90613 (Del. Super. 1989); Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261
(Nev. 1988); State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Gfeller,
1987 WL 14328 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
162. See People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Stone-
house, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989); Martin v. State, 501 So. 2d 1313 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d
220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). In Stonehouse, for example, Ms. Stonehouse was convicted of
third-degree murder for shooting her ex-boyfriend and fellow police officer with her police revolver
after he repeatedly stalked and harassed her. She was sentenced to seven to fourteen years impris-
onment. On appeal, amid curiae argued that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel
because trial counsel had failed to request jury instructions that would require the jury to consider
the cumulative effects of psychological and physical abuse when assessing the reasonableness of
her fear of imminent danger and had failed to present expert testimony on battering.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed Ms. Stonehouse's conviction and remanded the
case for a new trial, holding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request the jury in-
struction, that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present expert testimony on "battered
woman syndrome," and that "expert testimony regarding battered women is admissible as the
basis for proving justification in the use of deadly force where the defendant has been shown to be
a victim of psychological and physical abuse." Id. at 783. The court in Stonehouse concluded that
expert testimony on battering was necessary to rebut myths concerning the reasonableness of her
claimed act of self-defense, rebutting myths that would alternately blame her for staying in the
relationship as long as she did, constructing her as helpless or crazy, or hold her to a higher
standard because she was a trained police officer who "should have known better," or at least,
"fought like a man."
163. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Singh, 539 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Common-
wealth v. Tyson, 526 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
164. See, e.g., Maguigan, supra note 2; see also supra notes 100, 105-09 and accompanying
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Clemency efforts for battered women in many states across the
country suggest that there is national recognition of the problems that
battered women charged with homicide have faced at trial.1 65 One of
the major arguments advanced by proponents of clemency for battered
women has been that clemency is necessary so long as individual bat-
tered women are denied their rights to present an adequate defense at
trial and until society, including the criminal justice system that may
have failed to protect them from violence and then prosecuted them, is
able to respond adequately to the problem of woman abuse.,, National
165. Executive clemency is at the discretion of the governor or president. The executive may
choose to grant a pardon, doing away with the conviction, or commute a sentence. See Greenwald
& Manning, supra note 1, at 13. An advisory board, usually the parole board, may be authorized
to advise and make recommendations to the executive officer. Typically, executive officers follow
the recommendations of their advisory boards. Therefore, appeals to this body are an important
part of the clemency process. Usually, the clemency process involves several levels. First, the peti-
tion must meet basic requirements or be changed to comply with such requirements. Second, an
investigation is conducted into the petitioner's criminal, social, and institutional histories. Third,
the advisory or parole board makes a recommendation to the executive officer, based upon which
the officer makes a determination. Finally, where commutation is granted, there is usually a re-
view conducted under the auspices of the executive officer, sometimes including another hearing.
Because executive officers, as well as many executive advisory or parole board members, are
elected to office, they are particularly susceptible to public opinion. Community education about
battering and identifying support by the community are therefore also very important parts of the
clemency process.
Cookie Ridolfi, who has assisted many battered women and contributed to women's self-de-
fense work for the last two decades, has identified three situations in which clemency is appropri-
ate: (1) situations where the convicted person is factually innocent; (2) situations in which the
convicted person is technically guilty, but mitigating factors exist which argue for leniency; and
(3) situations in which the convicted person is technically guilty, but morally innocent. She sug-
gests that the third case is often hardest to argue, and frequently the most accurate description of
what has happened to a battered woman who fought back against her batterer. Essentially, the
argument is that, but for imperfections in the law as it currently exists, or trial factors such as
jury bias or improper jury instructions, the woman would have not have been convicted. See com-
ments of Cookie Ridolfi in Courtroom, Code and Clemency: Reform in Self Defense Jurispru-
dence for Battered Women (panel discussion), 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 829, 833 (1994).
Two Massachusetts practitioners have observed:
[Clemency] is no substitute for a criminal justice system that provides a battered woman
defendant meaningful access to a claim to self-defense. . . . However, the importance of
executive clemency for battered women who kill their batterers cannot be overemphasized.
The successful petitioner gains official forgiveness and a sense of personal vindication.
Moreover, the public nature of commutations focuses attention on the victims of extreme
domestic violence, educates society about their plight, and acts as an impetus for legislative
and social change.
Greenwald & Manning, supra note 1, at 14-15.
166. See Ammons, Discretionary Justice, supra note 2, at 5; Christine N. Becker, Clem-
ency for Killers? Pardoning Battered Women Who Strike Back, 29 Loy. LA. L. REv. 297, 299
(1995); Greenwald, supra note 1, at 14-15; Krause, supra note 2, at 771-772; Sue Osthoff, Clem-
ency for Battered Women, reprinted in DEFENDING BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 26, at 5-6;
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recognition of what has been called the "clemency movement" occurred
in October 1990, when the former Governor of Ohio, Richard Celeste,
issued a mass clemency of twenty-five battered women who had been
convicted of killing or assaulting their batterers, just before he left of-
fice.167 Very shortly after this highly publicized act, Governor William
Schaefer of Maryland granted clemency to eight battered women in-
carcerated in that state for killing their batterers. By 1993, governors
in seven states, including Jim Edgar of Illinois, Lawton Chiles of Flor-
ida, and Pete Wilson of California,"8 had granted clemency to thirty-
eight formerly battered women convicted of killing or assaulting their
batterers.169 At least twenty-six states have since set up committees to
review the cases of incarcerated battered women. °70 In recent years,
however, the trend toward granting clemency to battered women ap-
pears to have slowed. Most of the clemency petitions that have been
granted were granted in the 1980s and early 1990s.171 Since 1978, a
total of 88 battered women from 21 states have received clemency.172
There are nearly 40,000 women in prison in the United States. Of
Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1591.
167. See Ammons, Discretionary Justice, supra note 2; Leslie F. Goldstein, Contemporary
Cases in Women's Rights 276 (1994).
168. Goldstein, supra note 167, at 276.
169. Ammons, Discretionary Justice, supra note 2, at 4.
170. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 41. A recently enacted California statute permits the Board of
Prison Terms to report to the Governor "from time to time" the names of prisoners they deter-
mine ought to be considered for clemency on the basis of several criteria, including, "evidence of
battered woman syndrome." This statute, although well-intentioned, also raises the "special legis-
lation" problem, discussed above. CAL PENAL CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1996).
171. Data gathered by National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, Phila-
delphia, Pa. There may also be a connection between the decline in the granting of clemency and
the rise of "special" legislation. For example, policy makers often think that legislation which
makes expert testimony admissible in the trials of battered women who kill their batterers is the
key to battered women staying out of prison. Such measures can obstruct the possibility of clem-
ency for women by creating the illusion that clemency is no longer necessary. "A statute allowing
Battered Woman Syndrome evidence is not necessarily going to prevent convictions, but policy
makers may feel that there is no longer a problem." Comments of Rebecca Isaacs in Courtroom,
Code and Clemency, supra note 165, at 833. Moreover, the absence of "special" statutes is often
cited in support of clemency. In Ohio, for example, Governor Celeste justified clemency for bat-
tered women by the fact that a state Supreme Court decision specifically barred such testimony
until 1990 (when a statute permitting expert testimony on "battered woman syndrome" was
passed). In Maryland, clemency activism was also based on the inadmissibility of evidence of
battering; see also Rita Thaemert, Till Violence Do Us Part, State Legislatures, March 1993, at
26 (noting that Florida's parole board has adopted a rule making "Battered Women's Syndrome"
one of the criteria that may be considered in determining whether to grant clemency).
172. Telephone conversation with Holly White, National Clearinghouse for the Defense of
Battered Women, Philadelphia, Pa., November 20, 1995.
1996]
520 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
these, roughly 2,000 women are incarcerated for killing a husband, ex-
husband, or boyfriend -roughly one-third of all women in prison for a
homicide offense.' Of incarcerated women who killed a partner, a
number of studies have concluded that at least forty-five percent and
perhaps as many as ninety-seven percent were abused by the person
they killed.7 4 It is not known exactly how many of these women may
not have even gone to trial, consenting to plea bargain arrangements on
the advice of attorneys who were unaware of the fact that their clients
were battered and the role battering may have played in their cases, or
who were ignorant of the possible legal significance of evidence of bat-
tering.17 5 Of those who did go to trial, many may have received unfair
trials, either because of attorney ineffectiveness or judicial error in ap-
plying the law where evidence of battering was present. Since clemency
petitions can be based on many different grounds, including attorney
error or ineffectiveness, or judicial error that was not appealed or af-
firmed on appeal, one can only speculate about the number of cases in
which clemency might be sought. Nonetheless, the number of cases of
women in prison for killing their batterers in which clemency has been
sought, and the number in which clemency might be sought, suggests
that the impact of resistance to equality, manifested in attorney and
173. Statistics gathered by the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women,
Philadelphia, Pa. (on file with author). It appears that only a small percentage of women accused
of killing their batterers are acquitted at trial. Seventy-two to 80% are convicted or accept a plea.
Osthoff, supra note 166. Women who kill generally receive longer sentences, serving an average of
16-17 years. Battered women who kill tend to receive even longer ones. One statewide survey
showed that 83.7% of these women received sentences ranging from 25 years to life. Linda L.
Ammons, Parole: Post Conviction Relief For Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, at 5,
reprinted in DEFENDING BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 26 (citations omitted).
174. Id. For example, the Georgia Department of Corrections in 1992 released a report
indicating that 45 % of the women incarcerated there for killing a husband or lover had been
abused by that person. A 1989 Missouri study showed that of men and women incarcerated there
for murdering partners, 89% of the women and 57% of the men reported that the relationship
was violent prior to the partner's death. Jane Totman, surveying women in a California state
prison found that of the 30 women there who had murdered partners, 29 had been abused. See
ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 10 (1987). The National Clearinghouse for
the Defense of Battered Women is currently gathering statistics on this issue from around the
country.
175. See, e.g., Gibbs, supra note 1, at 44 (quoting New Jersey psychologist Julie Blackman
as saying, "I've worked [with] battered women who have talked only briefly to their lawyers in the
courtroom for 15 or 20 minutes and then they take a plea and do 15 to life. . . women who...
don't speak English well, or women who are very quickly moved through the system, who take
pleas and do substantial chunks of time, often without getting any real attention paid to the cir-
cumstances of their case."). See also Osthoff, supra note 166 (estimating that 72-80% of battered
women who kill are convicted or accept a plea).
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judicial conduct, has a substantial impact on women's lives and on the
criminal justice system.
V. RESISTANCE TO EQUALITY: REFLECTION AND DIALOGUE
The misconceptions about battered women and self-defense that I
have described flow from a failure to address the complexity of these
cases with a sensitivity to the problem of gender-bias. As we have seen,
resistance to equality can take many forms and can have many dimen-
sions. Reviewing the impact of this work on gender bias over many
years has provided an opportunity to reflect on these problems and con-
sider their implications for larger issues of equality. Thoughtful com-
ments in response to this article by Jody Armour 76 and Iris Young'7 7,
which follow, have also stimulated my thinking on the broader meaning
of this resistance.
The premise of the work seeking to ensure battered women equal
rights to trial has been the radical idea that battered women's exper-
iences had to be articulated, heard, and listened to. Recognition of so-
cial context, women's experiences of battering and societal response to
battering, was crucial, because without understanding the social con-
text, and the social circumstances of battering, the facts of a particular
case could not be understood. As in all legal cases, the critical struggle
is who gets to define the facts. Without first listening to women's exper-
iences, and without then understanding the social framework and expe-
rience of battering, it was simply not possible for lawyers to fairly re-
present battered women in these circumstances. But listening to
women, women who have been hurt and traumatized, who may not
have words to express their pain, who may not trust that anyone will
listen, who may be viewed as "difficult" because they are angry, or
whose gender, racial, cultural, or class experiences may be different
from the lawyer's, judge's or juror's, is not easy.178 As Jody Armour
observes, the telling of these experiences, the "narrative," to use his
phrase, is crucial. 179 Narrative in these cases is not only subversive, but
176. Jody Armour, Just Deserts: Narrative, Perspective, Choice, and Blame, 57 U. PITT. L.
REV. 525 (1996).
177. Iris Marion Young, The Generality of Law and the Specifics of Cases: A Comment on
Elizabeth Schneider, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 549 (1996).
178. See Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in
Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HoFsTRA L. REV. 1243 (1993); Lucie E. White, Subordina-
tion, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Bun.
L. REv. 1 (1990).
179. Armour, supra note 176; see generally Murphy, supra note 178.
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it can mean the difference between life and death. For battered women
who kill, this narrative, whether told to defense lawyers, in court, on
clemency petitions, or in other contexts "is their social reality, consti-
tute[s] their social identity, and vindicate[s] their social existence."1 80 I
agree that the stakes attached to the telling of this narrative are high,
and that this "explains much of the stubborn resistance to this
work." 8'
But there are many different forms of resistance. First, there is the
resistance of lawyers-who may find it hard to listen to the voices and
experiences of battered women, even when they can be surfaced and
articulated, and then must thoughtfully consider the implications of
these stories for the defenses that may be available within an equal
rights framework. Resistance to hearing these experiences as complex
and nuanced is explicit in the crude characterization of "abuse excuse"
which has become so popular.Y82 Judges' resistance to the story that
they have heard may lead them to engage in a process of gender con-
struction in which women's experiences are considered, "but in the
form of sexist stereotypes (of women as "bad" or "mad") which rein-
force the oppression and control of women in general."'8 3s Finally, be-
cause this work argues for affirmative recognition of the significance of
social context, and the necessary interrelationship between individual
action, social context and social responsibility, it challenges fundamen-
tal assumptions about "free will" in the criminal law, and triggers con-
siderable resistance for some criminal law scholars. 84
The theoretical challenge of this work has been the recognition of
what Jody Armour calls "constrained choice"' 85 and Iris Young calls
"situated agency."186 The dichotomy of victimization and agency,
presented in these cases, presents a simplistic formulation of battered
180. Armour, supra note 176, at 525.
181. Id.
182. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See also Fletcher supra note 18, at 571-576
(discussing the Menendez case).
183. Nicolson, supra note 1. In this article, Professor Nicolson details how English judges
interpreted the cases of two battered women who killed their assailants in similar factual contexts
very differently. In one case, the case of Kiranjit Ahluwalia, the defendant was seen as passive and
consequently treated by the court as mentally impaired. In the case of Sara Thornton, the defend-
ant was treated as a "bad" woman and found guilty. Nicolson concludes that battered women who
kill face the choice of being seen as "mad" or "bad" but their actions are not understood as
rational.
184. See Fletcher, supra note 18; Finkelstein, supra note 131.
185. Armour, supra note 176, at 525.
186. Young, supra note 177, at 550.
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woman as either victim or agent. But these cases challenge that dichot-
omy in fundamental ways, because they require us to understand a
more complex version of social reality-reality where choice is con-
strained by social experience, failure of state responsibility, and alloca-
tion of social resources. Traditional notions of individual agency and
free will must be tempered by recognition of social circumstance, of
situation, of the moral relations of domination.
I have argued that victimization and agency are understood as
though they are in opposition to each other-as if women must be pure
victim or pure agent-when in fact they are profoundly interrelated.1 87
A more textured and contextual analysis of the interrelationship be-
tween women's oppression and women's acts of resistance is crucial, for
we must understand both the social context of women's victimization,
or oppression, which shapes women's choices and constrains women's
agency and resistance, and also recognize women's agency and resis-
tance in a more nuanced way. The implications of this insight for the
criminal law's treatment of battered women who kill is considerable. It
means that the framework of equality, and the consequent challenge of
gender-bias have to shape the consideration of each of these cases dif-
ferently, based on the facts. While some lawyers, judges and scholars
have "gotten it," the resistance of others is profound.
As Iris Young has suggested, I seek both the general and the par-
ticular: application of the general framework of the criminal law to the
specific circumstances of battered women so as to ensure that individ-
ual battered women have equal rights to trial.188 I want to make sure
that every case is heard on its own merits, with full deliberation and
careful review of the facts, presented in a meaningful process of indi-
vidualization. I want to make sure that lawyers who represent battered
women and judges who decide their cases are sufficiently knowledgea-
ble about the particular circumstances of battering and the particular
experiences of the women involved to understand the facts of their
cases and the legal significance of those facts.
For that to happen, lawyers and judges who deal with these cases,
187. See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 2; Schneider, False Dichotomy,
supra note 5.
188. See Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 2. Young notes:
Schneider's argument thus suggests that the best solution to problems of exceptionalism
and stereotyping in cases of battered women who kill is to increase the generality of law
while attending to the specifics of cases. Such a conclusion is not specific to issues of bat-
tered women, or even women's issues, but bespeaks the nature of law itself.
Young, supra note 177, at 551.
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and legal scholars who write about them, must be sufficiently self-re-
flective to challenge our own resistance to the complex and nuanced
insights of equality. In hearing battered women's stories, and seeking to
understand their experiences, we must be sensitive to the problem of
gender construction in our interpretation of these experiences, consider-
ation of their legal implications, and translation of these experiences
into law.
